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THE COPYRIGHT/COMMERCE CLAUSE COLLISION: A
SUBJECT MATTER APPROACH
Kevin J. Hickey∗

This Article provides a novel theory of how the Constitution’s Copyright
Clause limits congressional legislation enacted pursuant to other
enumerated powers. The Copyright Clause is both a grant of power and
a limitation on the reach of that power: it provides that Congress may
create “exclusive Right[s]” in the “Writings” of “Authors,” but that
those rights must “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”
and last only for “limited Times.”
Congress possesses other
enumerated powers, however, including expansive Commerce Clause
authority. As intellectual property substantially affects interstate
commerce, may Congress avoid the limitations of the Copyright Clause
by legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause?
Analyzing the structure of the Copyright Clause and the key precedents
on inter-Clause conflicts, the Article proposes a subject matter
approach to resolve this question. The subject matter approach
determines whether the law at issue is truly a “copyright law” that must
comply with the Copyright Clause by examining the nature of the
material regulated, the actions proscribed, and the scope of the rights
granted by the law. The touchstone is whether the challenged law
grants authors generalized property rights in expression. By contrast, if
a law does not bear these hallmarks of traditional copyright protection,
it may be permissible economic regulation within the Commerce Clause
power, even if it relates to intellectual property.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Golan v. Holder held that
Congress’s restoration of copyright protection to certain works in the
public domain did not violate the limitations of the Constitution’s
Copyright Clause.1 In reaching this result, the Court left unanswered a
1. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012).
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critical antecedent question: why does Congress need to comply with the
Copyright Clause at all? Congressional power under the Copyright
Clause carries with it express textual limitations, such as the
requirement that copyright protection be afforded only for a “limited
Time[].”2 But other applicable congressional powers, such as the
Commerce Clause, are not so constrained. The legislation at issue in
Golan affected millions of artistic works,3 many of which have
significant commercial value.4 This is undoubtedly a matter that
“substantially affects” interstate commerce, and therefore within
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.5 Thus, even if the
Court in Golan had ruled that the Copyright Clause power may not be
used to remove a work from the public domain, why could Congress not
simply rely on the Commerce Clause as an alternative source of
authority?
The question of whether Congress can constitutionally avoid the
limitations of one enumerated power by legislating under another
enumerated power has arisen in fields as diverse as bankruptcy,6 civil
rights,7 and congressional spending.8 Though the problem is at least a
century old in the intellectual property context,9 the Supreme Court has
never addressed it directly. Nor has any generally-accepted theory
emerged from case law as to how to approach these issues. Indeed, in
the copyright context, constitutional challenges to the Digital
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (interpreting the
Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” requirement to mean that copyright terms must be “confined within
certain bounds”).
3. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
4. For example, the popular works of the great Russian composers Dmitri Shostakovich and
Igor Stravinsky are among the works whose copyright was restored by the legislation at issue in Golan.
See Tyler T. Ochoa, Is the Copyright Public Domain Irrevocable? An Introduction to Golan v. Holder,
64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 123, 139 (2011); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 904 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting
seven-fold increase in price of Shostakovich scores following copyright restoration).
5. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have the power . . . To regulate
commerce . . . among the several states . . . .”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995)
(providing that the Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate activates bearing a “substantial
relation” to interstate commerce).
6. See Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69 (1982) (holding
Congress may not avoid limits on Bankruptcy Clause power through Commerce Clause authority).
7. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252–57 (1964) (holding Title II of
Civil Rights Act constitutional on Commerce Clause grounds despite limitation on Fourteenth
Amendment powers).
8. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (holding that Congress may employ
spending power to achieve objectives outside of the scope of enumerated powers by attaching conditions
to the receipt of federal funds).
9. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94–98 (1879) (holding federal trademark legislation
unconstitutional under both Copyright and Commerce Clauses).
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Millennium Copyright Act10 (the DMCA) and the so-called “antibootlegging statutes”11 revealed a confused and conflicting array of
results, approaches, and judicial tests.12
The academic commentary, while impressive in quantity,13 is
frequently not much more satisfying. Too often, analysis of the issue
focuses solely on whether the Copyright Clause’s limitations should (or
should not) apply to one particular piece of legislation,14 without
articulating a broader approach to the conflict at the intersection of the
Copyright and Commerce Clauses.15 Such inter-Clause conflict is not
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1205 (2012).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2012).
12. With regard to the criminal enforcement provision of the anti-bootlegging laws, compare
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1276–80 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding the law as a valid
exercise of Commerce Clause authority because it was not “fundamentally inconsistent” with the
Copyright Clause), with United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
[hereinafter Martignon SDNY] (striking down the law because it was “copyright-like” yet did not
comply with the limitations of the Copyright Clause). The latter case was reversed by United States v.
Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Martignon]. With regard to the civil
enforcement provisions, compare KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 (C.D.
Cal. 2004) [hereinafter KISS I] (striking down the statute as outside of Copyright Clause powers because
the specific provisions of the Copyright Clause trump the general Commerce Clause power), with KISS
Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1171–76 (C.D. Cal. 2005) [hereinafter KISS II]
(reversing KISS I, reasoning that the Commerce Clause and Copyright Clauses are independent grants of
authority).
13. For example, the district court decision in the Martignon case, which found the antibootlegging statutes unconstitutional, has by itself inspired a small subfield of commentary. See
generally, e.g., Craig W. Mandell, Balance of Powers: Recognizing the Uruguay Round Agreement
Act’s Anti-Bootlegging Provisions as a Constitutional Exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause
Authority, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 673 (2007); Hugh C. Hansen et al., U.S. v. Martignon—Case
in Controversy, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1223 (2006); David Patton, The
Correct-Like Decision in United States v. Martignon, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
1287 (2006); Yavar Bathaee, Note, A Constitutional Idea-Expression Doctrine: Qualifying Congress’
Commerce Power When Protecting Intellectual Property Rights, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 441 (2008); Brian Danitz, Comment, Martignon and Kiss Catalog: Can Live Performances Be
Protected?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143 (2005); Adam Giuliano, Note, Steal
This Concert? The Federal Anti-Bootlegging Statute Gets Struck Down, But Not Out, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L.
& PRAC. 373 (2005); Andrew B. Peterson, Note, To Bootleg or Not to Bootleg? Confusion Surrounding
the Constitutionality of the Anti-Bootlegging Act Continues, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 723 (2005); Michael C.
Shue, Case Note, United States v. Martignon: The First Case to Rule that the Federal Anti-Bootlegging
Statute is Unconstitutional Copyright Legislation, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 131 (2005).
14. See, e.g., Giuliano, supra note 13, at 375–76 (concluding, without extending analysis or
considering other fields, that Commerce Clause power can be used to uphold anti-bootlegging statutes
as they complement copyright protection); Peterson, supra note 13, at 737–44 (concluding Congress
cannot resort to Commerce Clause power to uphold anti-bootlegging statutes without examining
consequences in other areas); Michael B. Gerdes, Comment, Getting Beyond Constitutionally Mandated
Originality as a Prerequisite for Federal Copyright Protection, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1461, 1468–70 (1992)
(concluding Congress may use Commerce Power to uphold sui generis protection of databases without
articulating any general theory).
15. There are several important and thoughtful exceptions to this generalization. See, e.g.,
Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329 (2012);
Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004);
Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property
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unique to the anti-bootlegging statutes or the DMCA, after all—parallel
questions arise in assessing the constitutionality of federal trademark,
trade secret, and database protection. A complete theory, therefore,
must answer the question of when each of the Copyright Clause’s
limitations will be applied externally to other enumerated powers across
all of these diverse areas. The problem of the Copyright and Commerce
Clause’s “collision”16 thus remains under-theorized.17
This Article analyzes the structure of the Copyright Clause and the
key judicial precedents on inter-Clause conflicts to conclude that the
limitations of the Copyright Clause must, in some cases, constrain the
exercise of Commerce Clause power.18 Having reached that conclusion,
the more difficult question becomes defining when the limitations of the
Copyright Clause will apply externally to the exercise of other
congressional powers. Relying on a novel analysis of the theories in the
existing literature, this Article maintains that a subject-matter-based
approach is the most defensible as a matter of copyright and
constitutional law and policy.19
The subject matter approach advanced here is a multifactor test that
looks to the nature of the material regulated, the actions proscribed, and
the particular rights granted to determine whether the law at issue is
truly a “copyright law” that must comply with the limitations of the
Copyright Clause. The touchstone is whether the challenged law grants
authors generalized property rights in expression—in particular, the
right to proscribe unauthorized reproduction of their works. If a law
does not bear these hallmarks of traditional copyright protection, it is
permissible economic regulation within the Commerce Clause power,
even though it may impact intellectual property. The subject matter
Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119 (2000). The theoretical
contributions of these and other commentators are discussed in detail in Part IV, infra.
16. This term is taken from the title of an article by Professor William Patry. See William Patry,
The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359 (1999). I will also use the expression “Copyright/Commerce Clause conflict”
to refer to the issue.
17. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 15, at 1335 (“Some [commentators] propose that the
[Copyright] Clause restrains Congress’s other powers.
These works, however, tend to be
undertheorized.”). This may be in part due to the sparse—and seemingly contradictory—Supreme
Court precedent. See KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 834 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (noting that only a “small
number of cases . . . touch on the constitutional question”); United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269,
1279 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting “tension” in the relevant Supreme Court precedents); Dotan Oliar,
Resolving Conflicts Among Congress’s Powers Regarding Statutes’ Constitutionality: The Case of AntiBootlegging Statutes, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 488 (2007) (“Unfortunately, the highly relevant
cases [on the enumerated powers collision problem] differ in their holding—two of them do not allow
Congress to circumvent limitations in one enumerated power by acting through another while three
others do—and in their reasoning.”).
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Parts IV & V.
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approach thus preserves a robust role for the Copyright Clause’s
limitations but confines them to their traditional purview. Moreover, the
subject matter inquiry does not depend on malleable notions of
“structural purpose,” “fundamental inconsistencies,” “constitutional
norms,” and the like—notions that have dominated the academic
literature on the issue.20 The subject matter approach instead provides a
simple, workable, and coherent doctrinal framework to resolve the
Copyright/Commerce Clause conflict.
This Article’s approach is distinct from those proposed by other
commentators. Some scholars have concluded that the Copyright
Clause limitations simply do not apply externally—that is, Commerce
Clause power operates independently from any Copyright Clause
constraints.21 Others, while agreeing that the Copyright Clause
limitations sometimes apply to some purported Commerce Clause
legislation, define both those limits and the scope of their applicability
quite differently. Professor Jeanne Fromer, for example, would apply
the Copyright Clause’s limitations to any legislation with the “structural
purpose” of “promoting the progress of science and useful arts,” unless
Congress proves by clear and convincing evidence that it intended to
further legitimate non-“Progress”-promoting interests.22 By contrast, the
subject matter approach is not dependent on difficult-to-ascertain
notions of congressional purpose, and would apply the Copyright Clause
limitations absolutely—albeit within a smaller sphere of legislative
actions. Professors Paul Heald and Suzanna Sherry take another, quite
different approach, relying on the history of the Copyright Clause to
deduce “implied limits”—such as a “public domain principle”—that
apply whenever “legislation . . . imposes monopoly-like costs on the
public through the granting of exclusive rights.”23 Their theory thus
differs both in the limitations that apply to Congress and in which
congressional actions will trigger those limits.
This Article makes three core contributions to the existing literature.
First, it collects and analyzes the various theories that have been
proposed to reconcile conflicts between the Copyright and Commerce

20. See infra Part IV.
21. See, e.g., Nachbar, supra note 15, at 277 (“The Intellectual Property Clause and its limits do
not represent generally applicable constitutional norms and Congress may therefore legislate pursuant to
the Commerce Clause without regard to the Intellectual Property Clause.”). Edward C. Waterscheid
takes a related view, in that he does not consider the Copyright Clause’s power to “secur[e] for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries,” to
limit a more general authority to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by whatever means
Congress chooses. See Edward C. Waterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts:
The Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1, 20–23 (2002).
22. See Fromer, supra note 15, at 1372.
23. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 15, at 1119, 1160.
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Clause powers, offering a novel and useful organization of the existing
case law and commentary. Second, it offers a defense of the subject
matter approach as doctrinally and normatively superior to the
alternative theories. Third, it details a proposed framework to give
precise, substantive content to the subject matter test—what is and is not
a “copyright law” for the purposes of Copyright/Commerce Clause
collision—to transform it into a clear and workable standard. The
resulting multifactor approach culls the strongest ideas from existing
commentary and offers a compelling reconciliation of the existing case
law.
The Article begins by identifying four key areas in which the
Commerce Clause power has been advanced to support legislation
arguably outside of the Copyright Clause’s limits: trademarks, database
protection, the DMCA, and the anti-bootlegging statutes. It next
reviews the relevant case law, beginning with the historical Supreme
Court precedents on inter-Clause conflicts, and then discusses more
recent copyright-related challenges to the DMCA and the antibootlegging statutes.
Having laid the necessary groundwork, the Article moves to theory.
Part III sets out the boundaries of the debate. On the one hand, treating
the enumerated powers as completely independent grants of authority
seems to write the Copyright Clause’s limitations out of the
Constitution, allowing, for example, patents on obvious inventions or
perpetual copyrights under the Commerce power. Such a result cannot
easily be reconciled with Supreme Court precedent. On the other hand,
holding the Copyright Clause’s limitations applicable to anything
“intellectual property-like” would seem to sound the death knell for,
inter alia, federal trademark law or trade secret protections, which stand
on equally firm legal ground. Existing doctrine thus implies that the
limitations of the Copyright Clause must be to some degree externally
applicable, but they cannot be so applied in every instance. To be
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, a theory of the
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision must articulate principles which
define a closed set of cases in which a given Copyright Clause limitation
will be externally applied.
Part IV critically analyzes the leading theories found in the case law
and commentary, organizing them into five conceptual categories. The
first group, which this Article calls “structural” theories, relies primarily
on inferences from the Constitution’s structure, arguing for broad
external application based on analogies to various other constitutional
provisions. The second group of theories focuses on the text of the
Copyright Clause, arguing that external application is only appropriate
when the language at issue is an affirmative limitation, as opposed to a
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mere lack of authority. This Article labels this view the “textualist”
approach, though it is distinct from any particular view of statutory
interpretation. “Purpose-based” theories, the third group, look to the
purposes behind the two enumerated powers at issue as the critical
factor. The fourth and largest group, which this Article calls “valuesbased” theories, argues that Copyright Clause limitations should be
applied to the Commerce Clause only when some normative trigger is
satisfied—e.g., when the law at issue is “fundamentally inconsistent”
with the Copyright Clause, or when the limitation at issue rises to the
level of a “constitutional norm.” The final group is termed “subject
matter” approaches. They answer the question of whether the Copyright
Clause ought to apply externally by reference to the substance of the
challenged law, such as the material it regulates and the specific rights
granted.
Part V defends and expounds upon the subject matter approach. It
argues that the subject matter test offers a consistent, workable approach
to the problem that resolves the conflicts in existing precedent. Next, it
defines explicit criteria as to what makes a particular piece of legislation
a “copyright law,” looking to (1) the actions proscribed, (2) the material
protected, and (3) the character of the rights afforded (including the
means of enforcing those rights). Finally, Part VI illustrates how the
subject matter test works in practice by applying this proposed
framework to several prominent examples of the Copyright/Commerce
Clause collision.
II. THE COPYRIGHT/COMMERCE CLAUSE COLLISION
The Copyright Clause24 of the Constitution reads: “The Congress
shall have the Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” It is well
recognized that the clause is “both a grant of power and a limitation.”25
In particular, the Clause has been interpreted to embody at least five
limitations attendant to the use of Copyright Clause power.26 First, as
rights secured are to the “Writings” of “Authors,” it is clear that only
original works may be copyrighted.27 As a corollary, only expression,
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Since the clause is read to grant Congress the power to establish
both copyright and patent law, the clause is more accurately referred to as the “Copyright/Patent Clause”
or the “Intellectual Property Clause.” Since this Article concerns itself principally with the power to
grant copyrights, I will refer to it as simply the “Copyright Clause” as a convenient shorthand.
25. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
26. Caroline T. Nguyen, Note, Expansive Copyright Protection for All Time? Avoiding Article I
Horizontal Limitations Through the Treaty Power, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1079, 1084 (2006).
27. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991) (“The sine qua
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and not facts or ideas themselves, can be the subject of a copyright.28
Third, from the phrase “limited Times,” copyright protection must only
persist for a finite period.29 Fourth—and controversially30—since only
“Writings” can be protected, the object of a copyright must be fixed in a
tangible medium, i.e., some physical rendering of the fruits of
intellectual labor.31 Finally, the preamble of the Copyright Clause
establishes that the legislation must “promote the Progress of Science,”32
though this requirement has been interpreted broadly and deferentially.33
If a piece of intellectual property-like legislation fails to satisfy one or
more of these limitations, is it therefore unconstitutional, or may the
Commerce Power—or another enumerated power34—be relied upon to
save it? The first section of this Part lays out four important areas in
which this question arises: trademarks, database protection, the DMCA,
and the anti-bootlegging statutes. Though this list is by no means
non of copyright is originality. . . . Originality is a constitutional requirement.”).
28. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (“[Under the
copyright statute,] no author may copyright facts or ideas.”).
The Feist Court arguably
constitutionalized this so-called “idea–expression” dichotomy—embodied in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)—by
making clear that originality requires independent creation in addition to minimal creativity. Feist, 499
U.S. at 345. According to Feist, facts are discovered, not created, and therefore are not original. Id. at
347–48. Ideas would seem to be non-original by the same line of reasoning. See Nguyen, supra note
26, at 1086–87 (arguing that the idea–expression distinction was given a “constitutional basis” in Feist).
Of course, ideas may be protected under the Copyright Clause’s patent power as “Discoveries.”
29. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (interpreting “limited Times” to mean that
copyright terms must be “confine[d] within certain bounds”).
30. No Supreme Court case has explicitly held that fixation is a constitutional requirement,
though that is the view of a majority of commentators and some lower courts have so held. Nguyen,
supra note 26, at 1087–89. The crux of the argument hinges on the meaning given to the word
“Writing” as used in the Copyright Clause. The majority view argues that “Writings” implies fixation,
see David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1409 (1995) (“[N]o respectable
interpretation of the word “Writings” embraces [unfixed expression].”), though critics argue that
fixation is merely a creature of the copyright statute, opting for a broader view of “Writings,” see PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 17.6.1, at 17:56 (3d ed. 2005) (“There is little doubt that performances
subject to protection are “writings” in the constitutional sense for, beyond literalism, there is nothing in
the mechanical act of fixation to distinguish writings from nonwritings.”).
31. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
32. “Science,” in the context of the Copyright Clause, means “knowledge and learning”; the
“useful Arts” refers to Congress’s power to grant patents. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888
(2012) (“Perhaps counterintuitively for the contemporary reader, Congress’ copyright authority is tied to
the progress of science; its patent authority, to the progress of the useful arts.”) (citations omitted).
33. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887–89 (copyright legislation is constitutional so long as Congress
“rationally could have concluded” that it “may promote knowledge and learning”).
34. This Article is limited to the intersection of the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause,
though the Commerce Clause is not the only alternate source of authority on which Congress might rely
when enacting copyright-like legislation that fails to satisfy the Copyright Clause’s limitations. For
example, in the context of the anti-bootlegging statutes—which were enacted to satisfy the United
States’ international treaty obligations—it is often argued that the Treaty Clause, instead of the
Copyright Clause, may be relied upon to support the legislation. See generally, e.g., Symposium,
Copyright Lawmaking Authority: An (Inter)nationalist Perspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 287 (2007); Nguyen, supra note 26.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014

9

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 1

10

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

exhaustive,35 these fields represent some of the principal controversies
in the Copyright/Commerce Clause conflict, and will be used as
examples throughout this Article to help analyze the theories proposed
to resolve the conflict. Having gained a better sense of the contours of
the controversy, this Part’s second section discusses the Supreme Court
and other precedents that speak most directly to the issue.
A. Areas of Tension
1. Trademarks
Though their historical roots lie in the law of unfair competition,36
today trademarks are usually classified as a species of intellectual
property.37 Federal trademark laws prohibit, inter alia, any person (other
than the registrant) from using a registered mark in commerce in ways
likely to confuse consumers.38 Trademarks thus afford exclusive rights
in (certain uses of) expression—the words, symbols, and pictorial
elements that make up a particular mark.
But these rights cannot be granted under the power contained within
the Copyright Clause, for two reasons. First, unlike copyrights and
patents, trademarks are not granted for “limited Times.” So long as the
mark remains in use in commerce39 and does not become a generic
term,40 trademark rights can exist in perpetuity,41 at least in theory.
35. Other areas of potential controversy include federal trade secret legislation, see The
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1831–1839 (2012), and the restoration of the copyrights
in certain foreign works that had fallen into the public domain, see 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012).
36. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property As Property: Delineating Entitlements In
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1754 (2008) (noting trademark has its origins in, and is indeed an
“outgrowth” of, the law of unfair competition); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and
Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1072 (2005) (“[I]n another era we treated intellectual property as a
species of business tort [instead of intellectual property].”).
37. It is common, for example, for introductory law school surveys on “intellectual property” to
cover copyright, patent, and trademark as the three main “species” of intellectual property. See
generally, e.g., ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS & TRADEMARKS (2003) (casebook covering copyright, patent, and trademark
law as forms of intellectual property); CRAIG A. NARD ET AL., THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(2006) (same). See also e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining “intellectual
property” as “compris[ing] primarily trademark, copyright, and patent rights”); Edward C. Walterscheid,
Divergent Evolution of the Patent Power and the Copyright Power, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
307, 308 n.8 (2005) (“In the modern era, trademarks are treated as a separate species of intellectual
property, distinct from patents and copyrights . . . .”).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2012).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012) (providing for cancellation of a mark that has been
“abandoned”).
40. See id. (providing for cancellation of a mark that has become “the generic name for the
goods or services”).
41. See Christopher Springman, Indirect Enforcement Of The Intellectual Property Clause, 30
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Second, there is no requirement that the marks protected be original (a
constitutional requirement for copyrights)42 or nonobvious (the
analogous constitutional requirement for patents).43 In other words,
trademarks are often not the work of “Authors” or “Inventors.” For
example, provided certain statutory requirements are met,44 there is
nothing to prevent acquiring a trademark on, for example, the mark
“Yummy Cookies,” though this phrase is obvious and does not satisfy
even the minimal amount of creativity required for a copyright.45
In the Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court struck down one of
Congress’s early attempts at federal trademark legislation,46 finding it
outside of Copyright Clause authority for the reasons outlined in the
preceding paragraph. Federal trademark regulation was also found to be
beyond the scope of Commerce Clause authority,47 though the TradeMark Cases were decided before New Deal expansions of Commerce
Clause power. There is little doubt that the current trademark statute—
the Lanham Act of 194648—passes muster under modern Commerce
Clause doctrine,49 in large part because it contains an express
jurisdictional limitation, restricting its applicability to marks used in
commerce that Congress has the power to regulate.50 After more than
fifty years without constitutional challenge, it is clear that trademarks
represent a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.51
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 565, 586 (2007) (“[T]he federal rights created under the Lanham Act are
perpetual.”).
42. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
43. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (establishing that nonobviousness
requirement of patent law is mandated by “constitutional command”).
44. In particular, since “Yummy Cookies” is a descriptive mark—it describes a characteristic of
the goods sold, see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2012)—the registrant would need to establish “secondary
meaning,” i.e., that the mark “has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce,” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(f) (2012), to register the mark.
45. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (“[T]he Constitution
mandates some minimal degree of creativity [as a prerequisite to copyright.]”).
46. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94, 99 (1879).
47. Id. at 96–99.
48. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–
1141).
49. The modern boundaries of Commerce Clause authority allow Congress to regulate: (1) the
use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persona
and things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (limiting the Lanham Act’s applicability to marks used in
commerce “which may lawfully be regulated by Congress”). It is unclear whether a trademark law like
the 1876 Act, containing no jurisdictional limitation, would be found to comport with modern
conceptions of Commerce Clause authority were it enacted today. See infra note 96 (discussing the
issue).
51. See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1959)
(“Clearly Congress has the power under the commerce clause to afford protection to marks used in
interstate commerce.”).
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Trademarks thus stand as a well-established example of a permissible
use of the Commerce Clause power to enact intellectual property
legislation that falls outside of the Copyright Clause’s grant of
authority.52
2. Database Protection
In the landmark case of Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service
Company,53 the Supreme Court considered the extent to which factual
compilations, or databases, may be copyrighted. The case was a dispute
between two publishers of telephone directories; one company had
copied the listings of the other and was sued for copyright
infringement.54 The Supreme Court held that originality—defined as
independent creation plus a minimal degree of creativity55—is a
constitutional prerequisite for copyright protection.56 Since telephone
directories consist of facts (which are discovered and not created),
copyright protection can exist only if the selection or arrangement of the
facts is (minimally) creative.57 As an alphabetic listing of names and
phone numbers is not original, no copyright existed in the telephone
directories in Feist.58
In holding that copyrighted works must be original, the Supreme
Court departed from a line of cases that had allowed copyright in nonoriginal databases on the basis of the work that went into compiling the
information—the so-called “sweat of the brow” doctrine.59 Such cases
argued that the labor expended in collecting facts was a form of
authorship, and should be protected lest others copy and free-ride off
these labors.60 After Feist, producers of databases argued that protection
against copying is needed to stop piracy and maintain economic
incentives to create and compile databases.61 The European Union,
seeking to create such positive incentives for commercial database
52. See Patry, supra note 16, at 391 (“Trademark protection is the prime example of permissible
Commerce Clause legislation in the area of intellectual property”).
53. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
54. Id. at 342–44.
55. Id. at 345.
56. Id. at 345–46.
57. Id. at 347–48.
58. Id. at 363.
59. Id. at 352–54.
60. See, e.g., Jeweler’s Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83, 88–89 (2d Cir. 1922)
(famously articulating the “sweat of the brow” doctrine).
61. See Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of
the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 47, 90 (1999) (“Sponsors characterize [U.S. database protection] as a necessary measure to
protect American companies from bankruptcy due to post-Feist pirates . . . .”) (citation omitted).
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creation, has passed a form of intellectual property protection for
databases.62
Responding to similar pressures, several proposals for sui generis
(non-copyright) database protection have been advanced in the U.S.
Congress.63 Given Feist, there is little doubt that such legislation cannot
be supported by Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause.64
Whether Congress may instead rely on Commerce Clause power to
establish a system of database protection, however, remains an open and
controversial question. As none of the proposals advanced has been
enacted, there is as of yet no case law on the issue, but the academic
debate on the issue has been intense, with strong voices on both sides.65
3. The DMCA’s Anti-Circumvention Provisions
The anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act prohibit the circumvention of certain technological
measures protecting copyrighted works.66 The DMCA distinguishes
between technological means that restrict particular uses of copyrighted
works—e.g., Apple’s former restriction that songs purchased through
iTunes may be used only on a limited number of devices67—and those
that prevent access to a copyrighted work—e.g., a website using
passwords and encryption to allow only paying users to view
copyrighted material. With regard to access restrictions, Congress
proscribed both the act of circumventing the protections as well as
trafficking in a device designed to circumvent such technological
62. Directive 96/9/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the
Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20. See generally Mark Powell, The European Union’s
Database Directive: An International Antidote to the Side Effects of Feist?, 20 FORDHAM INTL. L.J.
1215, 1215–23 (1997) (describing and giving background on the EU system of database protection).
63. E.g., H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999); H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999); H.R.
2652, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1998).
64. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSOCIATE WHITE HOUSE
COUNSEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS RAISED BY THE COLLECTIONS OF INFORMATION ANTIPIRACY
ACT, available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/righto.htm (concluding that legislation protecting
databases could not be supported under the Intellectual Property Clause) [hereinafter Dep’t of Justice,
CIAA Memo].
65. Compare, e.g., Justin Hughes, How Extra-Copyright Protection of Databases Can Be
Constitutional, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 159, 160–61 (2002) (contending that “substantial arguments”
support the constitutionality of database protection), with Pollack, supra note 61, at 49 (contending that
a proposal for database protection is “both unconstitutional and ill-considered”), and Yochai Benkler,
Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and
Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 537–39 (2000) (arguing that
some of the proposed database protections pass constitutional muster but others do not).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)–(b) (2012).
67. See Monika Roth, Note, Entering the DRM-Free Zone: An Intellectual Property and
Antitrust Analysis of the Online Music Industry, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 515,
524 (2008) (explaining Apple’s policy).
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restrictions.68 With regard to use restrictions, only trafficking in devices
designed to circumvent such restrictions was prohibited.69 The act of
circumventing use restrictions was not proscribed so as to preserve fair
use rights.70
Most of the constitutional challenges made against the DMCA allege
it violates the First Amendment by restricting speech or being
unconstitutionally overbroad.71 Though these are serious and important
arguments, since this Article is concerned with the limitations of the
Copyright Clause—and not the First Amendment—it will assume that
the DMCA survives First Amendment scrutiny, as several courts have
so held.72
But even if the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions do not violate
the First Amendment, they may still be unconstitutional as outside of the
scope of Congress’s enumerated powers. The primary claim is that the
DMCA violates the “limited Times” provision of the Copyright Clause
by granting copyright owners de facto perpetual rights through
technological protection measures.73 Though the DMCA applies only to
works still covered by copyright, there remains a practical concern that
allowing technological protection measures to be embedded into works
will prevent free copying and dissemination once the copyright (but not
the technological protection measure) expires.74 The reasoning goes as
follows: assume that a copyright owner sells only copy-protected
versions of his work while it remains under copyright. Once the
copyright expires, the owners of individual copies are theoretically free
to copy and disseminate what is now a public domain work. Practically,
68. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), (2) (2012).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2012).
70. See H.R. Rep. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (1998) (“[W]here the access is authorized . . . an
individual . . . would be able [to circumvent technological protections] in order to make fair use of a
work he or she has acquired lawfully.”).
71. See, e.g., Universal Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 325–41 (S.D.N.Y 2000)
(rejecting various First Amendment challenges to the DMCA).
72. See id.; United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1125–37 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(rejecting First Amendment challenges to DMCA). I will also ignore the claim that the DMCA
unconstitutionally limits fair use rights, as fair use rights, if constitutionally required at all, likely find
their source in the First Amendment and not the Copyright Clause, though the law is not clear on this
point. See Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1133–34 n.4.
73. See Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
74. The scenario laid out here is but one line of reasoning under which the DMCA may allow the
creation of a de facto perpetual copyright. Another common concern is the fear that public domain (or
other non-copyrighted) works will tied to a copyrighted “fig leaf”—some insignificant matter placed
together with and under the same technological protection as the public domain work. Because the fig
leaf is copyrighted, circumvention will violate the access restrictions of the DMCA, even if the only
work truly sought is in the public domain. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and
Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 1022 n.219 (explaining how such “fig leafs” are used to protect
uncopyrightable information).
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however, they cannot—though there is no legal reason they cannot
circumvent the technological protection measures themselves, many
users will lack the technical expertise to do so. Further, in all likelihood,
they will not be able to rely on the technical expertise of others to
circumvent the copy protection. Any device designed to circumvent the
protection will likely also circumvent the protection of other, non-public
domain works, and will therefore be in violation of the DMCA if it is
distributed to others.75 Though no court has found the DMCA
unconstitutional on such grounds, the anti-circumvention provisions
represent another regulatory area in which Congress might wish to rely
on Commerce Clause authority to avoid the limitations of the Copyright
Clause.
4. The Anti-Bootlegging Statutes
The anti-bootlegging statutes were passed in 1994 as part of the
Uruguay Round Agreement Act, pursuant to agreements the United
States had made in certain international intellectual property treaties.76
The statutes consist of a civil and criminal provision. The civil
provision (Section 1101) makes liable, “to the same extent as an
infringer of copyright,” a person who “without the consent of the
performer . . . fixes the sounds or images of a live musical performance
in a copy or phonorecord,” or transmits, sells, or distributes any copy or
phonorecord of said bootlegged performance.77 The criminal provision
(Section 2319A) prohibits the same activities, but associates a different
penalty: up to 5–10 years imprisonment.78 As a criminal statute, it
additionally requires that the bootlegger “knowingly” made the
recordings for financial gain.79
The anti-bootlegging statutes are arguably outside of the scope of the
Copyright Clause power for at least two reasons.80 The first derives
75. If access to a significant number of public domain works is blocked by technological
protections, it is possible that a sufficiently narrowly-tailored technology could be designed and
trafficked in without running afoul of the DMCA. Since any device marketed with knowledge of its
illegal circumventing use, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(C) (2012), or primarily designed for circumvention,
id. § 1201(a)(2)(A), is prohibited, any legal device must be conceived and designed with only its
permissible use—circumventing protection of public domain works—in mind. Finally, there will need
to be enough public domain works under technological measures such that obtaining access to public
domain works constitutes a “commercially significant purpose” that is more than “limited.” Id.
§ 1201(a)(2)(B).
76. Nguyen, supra note 26, at 1091–92.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2012).
79. KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 830 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
80. Some commentators have argued that, in addition to the “limited Times” and fixation
arguments, the anti-bootlegging statutes may violate other limitations of the Copyright Clause. See
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from the language of the Copyright Clause, which only allows Congress
to protect “Writings.”81 Though the Supreme Court has never made the
limitation explicit, most commentators (and some lower courts) believe
that inherent in the word “Writings” is a constitutional requirement of
fixation, i.e., that the creative work of the author must be embodied in
some physical, tangible form before it may be the subject of copyright.82
Assuming fixation is indeed constitutionally mandated, the first
argument for the unconstitutionality of the anti-bootlegging statutes runs
roughly thus: Since live musical performances are not fixed, they cannot
be protected under the Copyright Clause; therefore, the anti-bootlegging
statutes are unconstitutional if Congress cannot rely instead on its
Commerce Clause (or some other) power.
Though the requirement of fixation may seem rather technical or
formalistic to a reader unfamiliar with copyright, it has been a part of
federal copyright law since its inception83 and advances important
copyright policies. First, fixation serves significant manageability and
evidentiary concerns. If every fleeting expression—e.g., all the
utterances of everyday conversation—could be copyrighted, courts
might potentially be inundated with claims of copyright and difficult
factual disputes over who said what first.84 More fundamentally, the
fixation requirement can be seen as part of copyright’s quid pro quo
between the public and authors of creative works. The fundamental
rationale of granting a copyright is to facilitate the creation of works
which will benefit the public. After a limited period, the work falls into
the public domain and may be freely enjoyed and copied by all.85
Oliar, supra note 17, at 492–95 (arguing that the anti-bootlegging statutes may also conflict with the
Copyright Clause’s preamble and its requirements of authorship and originality). These arguments have
not achieved widespread recognition and have not been advanced in the cases challenging the antibootlegging statutes, so I do not elaborate upon them here.
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
82. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
83. Stefan Hubanov, The Multifaceted Nature and Problematic Status of Fixation in U.S.
Copyright Law, 11 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 111, 111 (2006) (“There is . . . a general understanding that
fixation has been an implicit part of federal copyright law since its very inception.”).
84. See id. at 119–20. Of course, since copyright law no longer requires any formalities to
secure a copyright, there is already a tremendous amount of material—e.g., all of the emails sent each
day—that is automatically copyrighted, so it is arguable how realistic this “inundation” fear is. Id.
85. The reader may note some tension between this understanding of the fixation requirement (as
a way to ensure copies exist for a robust public domain), and the history of copyright protection under
state common law. Before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, federal copyright protection was
triggered only when a work was first “published.” Prior to publication, the author possessed exclusive
rights in his work under common law copyright, which could persist from the time of creation until
publication—that is, potentially, in perpetuity. See generally Robert A. Gorman, An Overview of the
Copyright Act of 1976, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 856, 857–60 (1978). State copyright law thus created some
incentive to keep a work private and unpublished (so long as one did not wish to commercially exploit
it), yet the Copyright Clause left such regimes untouched. This result may appear anomalous if one
reads the Copyright Clause to embody strong pro-public domain policies (via “limited Times” and the
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Fixation, by mandating the creation of a tangible copy as a prerequisite
to copyright, ensures that there will be something to fall into the public
domain when the copyright term ends.86 Thus, the anti-bootlegging
statutes’ protection of unfixed works is seen by some as a serious
constitutional shortcoming, rather than a formalistic reading of
“Writings.”87
The second way in which the anti-bootlegging statutes may fall
outside of Copyright Clause power is more straightforward
conceptually. As discussed above, the Copyright Clause explicitly
requires that any rights secured last for “limited Times.” The antibootlegging statutes contain no statute of limitations, thus affording
“arguably perpetual” protection of live musical performances.88 Though
some commentators have argued for various interpretations of the
statutes that avoid this problem,89 the overwhelming majority of courts
and commentators have concluded the statute as written fails to satisfy
the “limited Times” requirement.90 It would thus appear that the antibootlegging statutes afford the kind of perpetual protection that the
Copyright Clause expressly proscribes, and so another grant of power
must be relied upon if they are to be upheld under the Constitution.91

fixation requirement). However, it is well-established that the Copyright Clause did not preclude state
regulation of copyrightable subject matter, see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 556–57 (1973)
(“[T]he Copyright Clause . . . does not indicate that all writings are of national interest or that state
legislation is, in all cases, unnecessary or precluded.”), at least until Congress chooses to act in the area
and preempts state protection, id. at 559. With the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress opted to preempt
the operation of state copyright law once a work has been fixed in a tangible medium. See 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 301(a) (2012).
86. Joseph C. Merschman, Note, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause: Halting
the Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress’s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV. 661,
663, 681 (2002). A similar function is served by the Copyright Act’s deposit provisions, which impose
fines if copies of a published work are not deposited with the Library of Congress for posterity. 17
U.S.C. § 407(a)–(d) (2012).
87. See Nimmer, supra note 30, at 1385, 1409–10 (viewing the anti-bootlegging statutes as part
of the “end of copyright”).
88. Id. at 1411.
89. For example, some commentators have argued that the anti-bootlegging statutes should be
read to incorporate general copyright duration provisions. E.g., Susan M. Deas, Jazzing Up the
Copyright Act? Resolving the Uncertainties of the United States Anti-Bootlegging Law, 20 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 567, 579 (1998). Other commentators have argued there is no “limited Times”
problem at all since the protection, properly conceived, only persists for the limited duration of the live
performance. E.g., Danitz, supra note 13, at 1198–99. While this last argument could be made with
respect to the anti-bootlegging statutes’ prohibition on fixing a live musical performance, it is more
difficult to see how it applies to the prohibition on distributing or selling the bootlegged performance.
90. Oliar, supra note 17, at 491.
91. This article looks only to the Commerce Clause as an alternate source of support, though
others have argued that the anti-bootlegging statutes can be upheld instead under Treaty Clause powers.
See supra note 34 (citing to articles that evaluate whether the Treaty Clause can support the antibootlegging statutes).
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B. Case Law
This section provides an overview of the case law most relevant to the
question of whether, and when, Congress may rely on Commerce Clause
power to support copyright-like legislation that cannot be sustained
under the Copyright Clause. First, it discusses the Supreme Court
precedents thought most relevant to the issue, though none of the cases
address the question explicitly. Next, it reviews the recent challenges to
the constitutionality of the DMCA and the anti-bootlegging statutes that
have been heard in the lower federal courts.
1. Supreme Court Precedents
The Trade-Mark Cases challenged the constitutionality of the
Trademark Act of 187692 as beyond Congress’s enumerated powers.
The Act, somewhat like modern trademark law, punished the fraudulent
use and counterfeiting of marks registered with the United States.93 The
Supreme Court struck down the law in its entirety. It first held that the
Act could not be supported by the Copyright Clause, since “[t]he
ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or
discovery.”94 In language that laid the ground for Feist a century later,
the court interpreted “Writings” to require originality,95 which many
trademarks lack. Finding the law outside of the Copyright Clause, the
Court turned to the Commerce Clause. Since the Act purported to cover
many marks that were used solely within a single state, the Court found
that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce did not reach so
far.96 Since the Court found that neither Clause supported the statute, it
did not directly address the issue of an intellectual property law that is
within the Commerce Clause power but fails to satisfy Copyright Clause
limitations. However, the analytic approach of The Trade-Mark Cases
appears to evince the notion that each enumerated power operates
92. Trademark Act of 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141 (1876).
93. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879).
94. Id. at 94.
95. See id. (“[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed . . . it is only such [works] as
are original . . . which are to be protected.”).
96. Id. at 95–98. The Court relied in particular on the fact that the 1876 Act lacked any
jurisdictional limitation limiting its applicability only to marks used in foreign, Indian, or interstate
commerce, id. at 96–97, such as that found in the modern trademark statute, see 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(2012) (limiting applicability to marks used in commerce “which may lawfully be regulated by
Congress”). It is unclear whether such a limitation is required under post-New Deal, more expansive
views of the Commerce Clause, which may sometimes reach purely intrastate activities. See, e.g.,
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (allowing regulation of farmer’s intrastate wheat production
for personal consumer under Commerce Power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995)
(allowing regulation of intrastate activities which “substantially affect” interstate commerce).
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independently—that is, falling short of the Copyright Clause’s
limitations does not prohibit reliance on Commerce Clause power to
support a copyright-like law.
The next important Supreme Court case, Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States,97 gives further support to this notion of independence of
powers, though it arises in a legal context—civil rights—quite distinct
from intellectual property.
Heart of Atlanta adjudged the
constitutionality of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which
prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations.98 Standing
in the way of the Act was a post-Reconstruction precedent—the Civil
Rights Cases99—which had struck down a similar law as outside the
scope of Congress’s powers.100 The Civil Rights Cases held that “state
action” was required before the power of the Fourteenth Amendment
could be invoked,101 since the Amendment reads that “No State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.”102 Declining to review that precedent, the Court upheld
Title II under Congress’s Commerce Clause power without considering
the impact of Fourteenth Amendment powers.103 Thus, although the
Court deals with the conflict of enumerated powers issue only
implicitly, Heart of Atlanta, like The Trade-Mark Cases, appears to
endorse the proposition that enumerated powers function largely
independently; at the least, falling short of one grant of power does not
necessarily foreclose the use of another power. However, given the
unique political context of Heart of Atlanta, along with the force of stare
decisis (i.e., the Court’s reluctance to overrule an 80-year-old
precedent), it is unclear how much should be read into the Court’s
approach.
On the other side of the issue is a more recent Supreme Court case,
Railway Labor Executives v. Gibbons,104 which made clear that the
limitations of enumerated powers cannot be avoided through reliance on
expansive Commerce Clause powers in all circumstances. At issue in
Gibbons was the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee
97. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
98. Id. at 242, 247.
99. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Civil Rights Cases).
100. Id. at 10–14.
101. Id. at 13. The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees citizens “equal
protection of the laws,” and section 5 grants Congress the “power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.”
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
103. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 257. Justice Douglas wrote separately to express the view that
legislation should instead be upheld under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 280 (Douglas,
J., concurring).
104. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
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Assistance Act (RITA),105 passed in response to the bankruptcy and
anticipated liquidation of Rock Island Railroad.106 RITA decreed that
economic benefits due to laid-off employees be treated as administrative
expenses in bankruptcy, essentially requiring these benefits to be paid
from the estate’s assets before the claims of other creditors were
satisfied.107 In Gibbons, the Court first held that RITA could not be an
exercise of Congress’s Bankruptcy Clause power, as that Clause only
provides for the establishment of “uniform” bankruptcy laws;108 RITA,
as a private bill affecting only one company’s reorganization, did not
satisfy this requirement of uniformity.109 Though the United States
never advanced the Commerce Clause as an alternate source of
authority, the Court, in a stunning bit of dicta, went on to write that the
Commerce Clause could not be used to eliminate a limitation in another
enumerated power:
[T]he Bankruptcy Clause itself contains an affirmative limitation or
restriction upon Congress’ power: bankruptcy laws must be uniform
throughout the United States. . . . Thus, if we were to hold that Congress
had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation
on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.110

Thus Gibbons would seem to put to rest the idea that the Commerce
Clause can be relied upon as an independent grant of authority in all
circumstances; clearly, the limitations of other enumerated powers
cannot always be so avoided.
This “trio” of cases—The Trade-Mark Cases, Heart of Atlanta Motel,
and Gibbons—are generally considered to be the principal guidance the
Supreme Court has offered so far.111 Unfortunately, little is clear from
the cases other than the obvious “tension” between the holdings112 and
the fact that none of the cases can be said to control the resolution of the
105. Pub. L. No. 96-254, 94 Stat. 399 (1980).
106. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 459–61.
107. Id. at 461–63.
108. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“Congress shall have power . . . [t]o establish . . . uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”).
109. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 471 (“A law can hardly be said to be uniform . . . if it applies only to
one debtor.”).
110. Id. at 468–69 (citations omitted).
111. See Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2007) (analyzing the Copyright/Commerce
Clause collision by focusing on “a trio of cases—the Trade-Mark Cases, Heart of Atlanta, and
Gibbons—in which the Supreme Court has considered issues similar to the one that confronts us”). In
addition to these three cases, commentators have looked to a diverse array of precedents for further
guidance, see, e.g., Nachbar, supra note 15, at 299–308 (examining the relevance of early 20th-century
regulatory taxation cases); Oliar, supra note 17, at 479–84 (examining the relevance of cases involving
Congress’s borrowing powers and powers under the Militia Clause).
112. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999).
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Copyright/Commerce Clause collision.113 It is thus not too surprising
that the lower courts have reached an array of conclusions—and
employed a variety of conflicting standards—in adjudging the
constitutionality of the DMCA and the anti-bootlegging statutes on
enumerated powers grounds. The next section summarizes this case
law.
2. Modern Copyright Controversies
a. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The principal case involving an enumerated powers challenge to the
DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions is United States v. Elcom.114
Elcom was the software developer of a product that allowed consumers
to circumvent use restrictions associated with Adobe eBooks.115
Publishers using Adobe were allowed to specify whether purchasers of
eBooks were able to, inter alia, make copies of the eBook, print a paper
version, or email the document to others.116 Elcom’s technology
removed these restrictions, and Elcom was indicted under the DMCA
for trafficking in their software.117 Before reaching the enumerated
powers issue, the court rejected challenges to the DMCA on First
Amendment118 and due process grounds.119
Acknowledging the force of Gibbons, the Elcom court stated that
“Congress may not use [Commerce Clause] power in such a way as to
override or circumvent another constitutional restraint.”120 Influenced
by the Moghadam case, discussed below,121 Elcom articulated the proper
test as whether the DMCA’s use of Commerce Clause power was
“irreconcilably inconsistent” with the Copyright Clause.122 The court
first considered whether the DMCA’s purpose was inconsistent with the

113. See Martignon, 492 F.3d at 146 (“We find no absolute answers [in the Supreme Court
precedents] because none of the cases . . . is directly on point.”).
114. United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002). In another prominent
case adjudging the constitutionality of the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions, the Second Circuit
declined to reach the issue of whether Copyright Clause limitations precluded Congress’s authority to
enact the DMCA on procedural grounds. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444–45
(2d Cir. 2001).
115. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1118.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1119.
118. Id. at 1125–37.
119. Id. at 1122–25.
120. Id. at 1138.
121. See infra notes 137–142 and accompanying text.
122. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. at 1140.
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purposes of the Copyright Clause.123 Viewing anti-circumvention
provisions as complementing the existing intellectual property regime
by providing effective means to enforce IP rights in a digital world, the
court found there was no serious inconsistency.124 Second, the court
looked at the pragmatic costs and benefits of the regulation from a
copyright perspective,125 and concluded that the alleged violations of the
Copyright Clause were too “tenuous” to be persuasive.126
The other case that has adjudicated a Congressional authority
challenge to the DMCA is 321 Studios v. MGM.127 321 Studios, the
maker and seller of software which allowed users to copy DVDs despite
encryption protections, argued that its software was legal because, inter
alia, the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA exceeded
Congress’s enumerated powers.128 The court rejected this challenge, but
relied heavily on the Elcom analysis,129 thus offering few insights
independent of that decision.
In summary, although no court has struck down the DMCA on
enumerated powers grounds, there have been few cases directly
addressing the issue, and even courts upholding the law acknowledged
that the Copyright/Commerce Clause issue presented a “difficult
question.”130 The next section looks at the analogous case law with
regard to the anti-bootlegging statutes, where the courts have been more
divided and the controversy even more acute.
b. The Anti-Bootlegging Statutes
Three separate cases—United States v. Moghadam,131 KISS Catalog
v. Passport International Products,132 and United States v.
Martignon133—have produced five published decisions on whether the
anti-bootlegging statutes are a constitutionally valid exercise of
congressional power. The results have been mixed, with two decisions
123. See id. at 1140 (accepting argument that “Congress’ intent [in enacting the DMCA] was to
protect intellectual property rights and thus promote the same purposes served by the Intellectual
Property Clause”).
124. Id. at 1140–41.
125. See Oliar, supra note 17, at 499 (viewing the Elcom analysis as weighing “the DMCA’s
copyright-related costs and benefits”).
126. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
127. 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
128. Id. at 1089–90.
129. See id. at 1103–04 (quoting Elcom at length and adopting its conclusions).
130. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.
131. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
132. KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2004), vacated by 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1171–76
(C.D. Cal. 2005).
133. Martignon SDNY, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev’d, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007).
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finding either the criminal or civil anti-bootlegging statute
unconstitutional134 and three upholding the laws (including both
appellate decisions).135 The facts of each case are similar—a bootlegger
is sued or indicted, and challenges the constitutionality of the antibootlegging statutes’ civil or criminal provision. The courts all agreed
on two central premises: (1) the anti-bootlegging statutes could not be
sustained under the Copyright Clause, due to either a lack of fixation or
the temporally unlimited protection;136 and (2) the Commerce Clause
power, standing alone, would be enough to support the legislation. They
disagreed as to whether it was permissible, in this context, for Congress
to avoid a Copyright Clause limitation by using Commerce Clause
power. Most interesting for purposes of this Article are the theories and
rationales put forth in the opinions. This part surveys the analytical
approach of each decision with regard to the Copyright/Commerce
Clause collision.
In Moghadam, the Eleventh Circuit heard a challenge to the criminal
anti-bootlegging statute based on the argument that the Copyright
Clause’s “Writings” requires the subject matter protected be fixed in a
tangible medium;137 for procedural reasons, the court did not address the
argument that the anti-bootlegging statutes afforded perpetual protection
in contravention of “limited Times.”138 The court assumed arguendo
that the lack of fixation precluded the use of the Copyright Clause,
turning directly to the issue of whether it might nonetheless be
supported under Commerce Clause power.139 The Moghadam court
concluded Commerce power could be validly relied upon, using two
alternate theories. The first theory was that the Copyright Clause’s
“Writings” requirement was not intended as an “affirmative
limitation”140—unlike the “uniform” requirement at issue in Gibbons
(and, presumably, the “limited Times” requirement)—and thus did not
preclude the use of other enumerated powers. The second theory
articulated the test as whether “the particular use of the Commerce
Clause [is] fundamentally inconsistent with the particular limitation in
134. See Martignon SDNY, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 429 (finding the criminal anti-bootlegging statute
unconstitutional); KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (finding civil anti-bootlegging statute
unconstitutional).
135. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1282 (finding criminal anti-bootlegging statute constitutional);
Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2007) (same); KISS II, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (finding civil
anti-bootlegging statute constitutional).
136. There is one exception to this generalization, as the Moghadam court only heard the fixationbased challenge (and not the “limited Times” argument), and assumed, arguendo, that the lack of
fixation precluded reliance on the Copyright Clause. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274.
137. Id. at 1275–77.
138. See id. at 1274 n.9 (explaining that Moghadam failed to preserve this argument for appeal).
139. Id. at 1274.
140. Id. at 1280.
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the Copyright Clause.”141
Later courts—e.g., Elcom, discussed
supra142—picked up on and followed this “fundamentally inconsistent”
test, though Moghadam did not elaborate on what it meant by this
language.
The KISS Catalog cases adjudicated the constitutionality of the civil
anti-bootlegging statute. The first district court opinion in KISS (KISS I)
found the law unconstitutional. Judge Rea found it unnecessary to
decide whether the statute violated the fixation requirement, as it clearly
could not be supported under Copyright Clause power since the
protection afforded was not for “limited Times.”143 Relying heavily on
Gibbons,144 Judge Rea reasoned that allowing recourse to the Commerce
Clause in this context would effectively write the Copyright Clause’s
limitations out of the Constitution.145 After Judge Rea’s death, the new
judge assigned to the case granted a motion to reconsider (after the
United States intervened), and vacated the finding of unconstitutionality
in KISS II.146 KISS II advanced two alternate grounds for its decision
that Section 1101 was a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power. The
opinion first advanced a sweeping argument that enumerated powers
should simply be analyzed independently:
[O]nce the Court concludes that the Statute does not fall within the
purview of the Copyright Clause, it need no longer consider whether it
complies with the limitations of the Copyright Clause. . . . One need only
find an alternative source of constitutional authority. This Court finds
such authority in the Commerce Clause.147

In the alternative, the court adopted Moghadam’s approach and held
Section 1101 was not “fundamentally inconsistent” with the Copyright
Clause.148 It offered several reasons to find no fundamental conflict,
relying heavily on the notion that legislation should be presumed
constitutional.149
The district court opinion in Martignon (Martignon SDNY) found the
141. Id. at 1280 n.12 (emphasis added).
142. See supra notes 114–126 and accompanying text.
143. See KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 831–33 (C.D. Cal. 2004). Judge Rea rejected alternative
constructions of the statute which implied a time limit from another part of the copyright code as
unreasonable. Id. at 832–33.
144. See id. at 836 (“[T]his Court finds [Gibbons] to be the most instructive case on this issue.”).
145. See id. at 837 (“The framers . . . included the explicit limits contained in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Permitting the current scope of the Commerce Clause to overwhelm those limitations altogether would
be akin to a ‘repeal’ of a provision of the Constitution.”).
146. See KISS II, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1171–76 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
147. Id. at 1175.
148. Id. at 1176 (“Even if a ‘fundamental conflict’ with the Copyright Clause would invalidate the
Statute, none exists here.”).
149. See id. at 1175–76.
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criminal anti-bootlegging statute unconstitutional. Like KISS II,
Martignon SDNY advanced two theories of the Copyright/Commerce
Clause collision. Judge Baer’s first theory related to whether the antibootlegging statute was “copyright-like.”150 If Congress was acting
within the copyright field, the reasoning goes, it is bound by the
limitations of the Copyright Clause regardless of the existence of
Commerce power.151 Baer looked to the text, history, and purpose of the
anti-bootlegging statute to hold it was copyright-like, and therefore
unconstitutional.152 In the alternate, Baer applied the Moghadam
“fundamental inconsistency” test and concluded, in light of the express
“limited Times” language, perpetual protection for live performances
was a sufficiently serious inconsistency.153
Though the Second Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in
reversing Judge Baer, the court seems to adopt a version of his first
theory, albeit in stricter form. The test, in their view, was not whether a
piece of legislation was “copyright-like”; rather, it was whether it was in
fact a “copyright law.”154 The touchstone of copyright law, in the
Second Circuit’s view, is a grant of “property rights in expression.”155
Relying almost exclusively on the criminal nature of the antibootlegging statute before it—enforced not via property rights but
instead coercive government action—the court held it was not a
copyright law and so the use of Commerce Clause authority was
proper.156 The court expressly left open the question of whether the civil
anti-bootlegging statute was constitutional under this analysis.157

150. Martignon SDNY, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
151. See id. at 425 (“Congress’ power to act in the copyright field is limited by the confines of the
Copyright Clause.”).
152. Id. at 420–22.
153. Id. at 429.
154. See Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s cases allow the
regulation of matters that could not be regulated under the Copyright Clause in a manner arguably
inconsistent with that clause unless the statute is a copyright law.”) (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 150.
156. See id. at 152 (“Section 2319A does not create, bestow, or allocate property rights in
expression [and so is not a ‘copyright law’]. We therefore conclude that it was not enacted under the
Copyright Clause.”).
157. Id. at 152 n.8. The reader may also wonder whether this analysis means that the criminal
copyright enforcement provisions, see 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012) (providing for criminal penalties for
“willful” infringement of a copyright for commercial gain), must be supported by an act under the
Commerce Clause, and not the Copyright Clause. The issue may be resolved by recognizing that
“copyright law” is used in this context as a term of art—defining laws so similar to copyright that they
must be scrutinized to comply with the Copyright Clause’s limitations—and is not coincidental with the
limit of Congress’s “necessary and proper” powers under the Copyright Clause. See infra Part V.B.1.b
(explaining this point in more detail).
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III. THE CONTOURS OF THE DEBATE
As the preceding Part illustrates, the courts have taken a diverse and
conflicting set of approaches to the Copyright/Commerce Clause
collision. As we will see in greater detail later, this diversity extends to
the views of the legal commentators who have examined the issue.158
Before organizing and examining these theories, it is useful to set out
the boundaries of the debate. This Part argues that the views at either
end of the spectrum—complete independence of powers on the one
hand, and complete external application of the Copyright Clause’s
limitations on the other—cannot be supported on any reasonable reading
of the applicable Supreme Court precedents. Though the simplicity of
each of these views may be initially appealing, this Article contends that
any doctrinally sound theory of the Copyright/Commerce Clause
collision must be more nuanced. In other words, the proper question is
not whether a Copyright Clause limitation ought to apply to the use of
Commerce Clause power, but when such a limitation must apply. Any
theory offered to answer this question must define some closed set of
circumstances under which a given Copyright Clause limitation will be
applied to exercises of other enumerated powers if it is to be consistent
with the precedents this Part analyzes.
A. The Independence-of-Powers View
Based on a naïve textual reading of Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution—which lists the enumerated powers of Congress—one
view of the Copyright/Commerce Clause collision would simply read
each grant of power in Section 8 as operating independently. After all,
each grant of power is listed separately, and makes no explicit reference
to any other enumerated power. Why should we read limitations into
the Commerce Clause that are not written into the Commerce Clause?
The strongest language in KISS II,159 as well as that of some
commentators,160 takes this view of the issue.
This “independence-of-powers” view, despite its textual appeal,
cannot be easily reconciled with much of the Supreme Court’s
constitutional intellectual property jurisprudence. It is difficult to
understand why the Supreme Court in Feist expended so much energy
articulating a constitutional originality requirement if “sweat of the
brow” protection could simply be had via reliance on the Commerce
158. See infra Part IV (reviewing and organizing theories offered in legal commentary).
159. See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning in KISS II).
160. See, e.g., Gerdes, supra note 14, at 1468 (“[T]he Commerce Clause is not limited by lessthan-explicit prohibitions in other constitutional clauses.”).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/1

26

Hickey: Copyright/Commerce Clause Collision: A Subject Matter Approach

2013]

THE COPYRIGHT/COMMERCE CLAUSE COLLISION

27

Clause.161 The fact that Congress was clearly exercising Copyright
Clause power in the provisions of the Copyright Act at issue in Feist is
not enough to distinguish the case. As a matter of black letter
constitutional law, Congress’s stated basis of authority is irrelevant in
assessing a law’s constitutionality;162 courts are to look to all the
possible sources of congressional power regardless of how Congress
purports to justify a law. Nor can Feist be distinguished on the ground
that a Commerce power argument was not raised. Principles of
constitutional avoidance163 would seem to require that courts at least
look to potential Commerce Clause authority before laying down a
constitutional rule. The Feist court never discussed the Commerce
Clause, strongly suggesting that it viewed the Copyright Clause as
completely governing the issue.
To a similar effect as Feist is Graham v. John Deere Company, which
held a certain level of innovation (i.e., of non-obviousness) to be a
constitutional requirement for the issuance of a patent.164 Graham
seems particularly in conflict with an independence-of-powers view as it
dealt with an act of Congress (unlike the judicial interpretations at issue
in Feist) which appeared to lower the threshold of non-obviousness
required for patentability.165 Making clear that a particular level of
innovation (or more) was required by the Constitution’s requirement
that patents “promote the progress of . . . useful Arts,”166 the Court
interpreted a provision of the 1952 Patent Act to avoid a constitutional
violation.167 If Commerce Clause authority was available to support the
legislation, one would assume that the Graham court would have looked
to this power before invalidating (or at least materially altering) a
congressional action.
Perhaps most fatal to the independence-of-powers view is the
Supreme Court’s approach in Dastar Corporation v. Twentieth Century
161. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the holding in Feist).
162. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (“[T]he constitutionality of
action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.”).
163. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–49 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (listing principles of constitutional avoidance).
164. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966).
165. Id. at 3–4 (“The questions . . . before us, [include] what effect the 1952 Act had upon
traditional statutory and judicial tests of patentability . . . . We have concluded that . . . the general level
of innovation necessary to sustain patentability remains the same.”).
166. See id. at 6 (“Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge
are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress
of . . . useful Arts.’ This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.”) (citing
A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)).
167. See id. at 13–17 (rejecting the view that § 103 of the 1952 Act was intended to lower the
level of non-obviousness required for patentability and instead construing the statute as enacting judicial
views of non-obviousness).
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Fox Film Corporation.168 At issue in Dastar was how a particular use
of Commerce Clause authority—Section 43 of the Lanham Act169—
should be interpreted. Fox charged that Dastar, by editing and selling a
public domain documentary without any attribution to the author, had
misrepresented the “origin” of goods in violation of the Lanham Act.170
Since the Lanham Act is clearly an exercise of Commerce Clause
power, the independence-of-powers approach would see the Copyright
Clause as having no relevance to the statutory construction issue in
Dastar. To the contrary, the Dastar Court interpreted the Lanham Act
with an eye towards avoiding a potential Copyright Clause conflict.171
The court read “origin” to mean physical source—and not original
authorship—since “[t]o hold otherwise would be akin to finding that
§ 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which
Congress may not do.”172 Dastar is thus powerful evidence that the
limitations of the Copyright Clause have relevance to the exercise of
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.
B. Broad External Application of Copyright Clause Limitations
At the other end of the spectrum is the view that the Copyright
Clause’s limitations ought to apply broadly to any exercise of
congressional power that is patent- or copyright-like. This is the strong
form of the district court opinion in Martignon,173 and a few
commentators have taken such a hard-line approach.174 The difficulty of
this view—if terms like “copyright-like” are given a reasonably broad
meaning—is that it is almost impossible to reconcile with the existence
of federal trademark and trade secret protection. As discussed above,
federal trademark law, though a species of intellectual property that
affords rights in expression, is well accepted as a valid exercise of
Commerce Clause power.175 Though trade secret is principally a
168. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
169. Id. at 31. See also supra notes 46–52 (explaining how Lanham Act is understood today as a
valid exercise of Commerce Clause power).
170. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 25–27.
171. See id. at 34 (“[I]n construing the Lanham Act, we have been ‘careful to caution against
misuse or over-extension’ of trademark and related protections into areas traditionally occupied by
patent or copyright.”) (citing TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)).
172. Id. at 37.
173. See supra notes 150–153 (discussing the district court decision in Martignon).
174. See, e.g., Patton, supra note 13, at 1298–99 (agreeing with Martignon’s “copyright-like”
approach and taking expansive view on when legislation is “within the scope of the Copyright Clause”).
Patton notes that the existence of federal trademarks mean that “[n]ot all ‘copyright-like’
legislation . . . will necessary fall within the scope of the Copyright Clause,” id. at 1302, but it is unclear
why this conclusion should not follow from his analysis.
175. See supra Part II.A.1.
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creature of state law,176 Congress has afforded some federal protection
for trade secrets through the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (the
EEA).177 The EEA creates criminal penalties for the misappropriation
of another company’s trade secrets,178 thus granting protection for
certain economically valuable ideas. If the “intellectual property-like”
approach is taken literally, the EEA would rest on suspect constitutional
grounds as it does not comport with the limitations of the Copyright
(and Patent179) Clause—it affords potentially perpetual protection in
ideas to individuals (the owners of trade secrets) who are not necessarily
inventors or authors. However, like federal trademark protection, it is
widely assumed that federal trade secret law is a valid exercise of
Commerce Clause power.180 The Supreme Court’s analysis in Kewanee
Oil Corporation v. Bicron Corporation, which upheld state trade secret
law as not preempted by federal patent law or the Copyright Clause,181 is
suggestive of this conclusion. The Kewanee court took the view that
trade secret and patent operated harmoniously within their separate
spheres,182 and thus trade secret did not seriously violate the purposes
and limitations of patent law and the Copyright Clause.183
Given that neither the independence-of-powers nor a broad
“copyright-like” view can be easily maintained, any approach to the
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision must satisfy a few broad criteria
if it is to be consistent with Supreme Court precedent. In particular,
such a theory must set forth principles which define some sphere—
narrow enough to exclude trademark, but broad enough to include core
Copyright Act and patent laws like those in Feist and Graham—where
Copyright Clause limitations will apply. Professor Thomas Nachbar is
correct in that the question is one of external application across
enumerated powers, a distinction “between limits that are internal to a
particular constitutional provision and limits that apply throughout the

176. Heald & Sherry, supra note 15, at 1194.
177. Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012)).
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2012) (prohibiting unauthorized appropriation of trade secrets).
179. Though I have used “Copyright Clause” as a shorthand for Article I, section 8, clause 8
throughout this piece, the constitutional provision is more completely named as the “Copyright/Patent
Clause” since it forms the basis of congressional power for both areas of the law—i.e., protection for
both “Writings” (copyright) and “Discoveries” (patent). See supra note 24 (establishing this shorthand).
Since the EEA provides protection for ideas, it is more nearly “patent-like” than “copyright-like.”
180. Heald & Sherry, supra note 15, at 1194–95 (using federal trade secret law as example of
valid use of Commerce Clause power); Patry, supra note 16, at 394 (same).
181. Kewanee Oil Corp. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974).
182. See id. at 493 (“Trade secret law and patent law have co-existed in this country for over one
hundred years. Each has its particular role to play, and the operation of one does not take away from the
need for the other.”).
183. Id. at 480–92.
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Constitution or are, for lack of a better term, external.”184 But Nachbar
is incorrect to view the internal versus external distinction as an all-ornothing inquiry—i.e., that a Copyright Clause limitation must either
(like the First Amendment) apply to all congressional actions, or instead
solely to exercises of the Copyright Clause.185 It is certainly possible
that a particular Copyright Clause limitation will be applied externally to
some uses of other enumerated powers and not to others. In fact, as this
Part argues, defining such a sphere of applicability is the only way to
make sense of Supreme Court precedent.
IV. THEORIES OF THE COPYRIGHT/COMMERCE CLAUSE CONFLICT
This Part reviews and analyzes the principal theories of the
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision that have been offered in the case
law and legal commentary, organizing them into five broad categories:
(1) structural analogies; (2) textualist theories; (3) purpose-based
theories; (4) values-based theories; and (5) subject matter theories. This
organization synthesizes a voluminous academic literature, and offers a
novel way to understand the strengths and shortcomings of the
competing theories.
A. Structural Analogy
Structural-analogy theories typically argue for broad external
application of the Copyright Clause’s limitations by likening the
Copyright Clause to other constitutional provisions which have been
applied to uses of the Commerce Clause or other congressional
powers.186 For example, former Professor William Patry’s analysis
relies heavily on Professor Laurence Tribe’s work on the Treaty
Clause.187 Tribe argued that Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution—
which requires treaties to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the
Senate—precluded reliance on usual Article I powers to approve treaties
by a simple majority of both houses.188 Patry, in an influential law
review article, draws an analogy between the Treaty Clause and the
Copyright Clause, arguing that the Copyright Clause’s limitations ought
184. Nachbar, supra note 15, at 297.
185. Id. at 295–98.
186. This “structural” categorization draws on related analyses offered by two other scholars. See
Oliar, supra note 17, at 500–01 (discussing “structural inference” approaches); Nachbar, supra note 15,
at 287–94 (discussing legal academia’s “rhetoric of structure”).
187. Patry, supra note 16, at 375–76.
188. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1249–78 (1995) (arguing that procedures laid
on its Constitution’s Treaty Clause provide exclusive procedure for congressional approval of treaties).
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to apply externally as well—precluding, in his view, federal database
protection.189 Professors Pollack, Heald, and Sherry have relied on a
similar analogy to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments, which have been held to limit the exercise of
Commerce Clause power based on federalism principles.190
There are two serious problems with a structural-analogy approach.
First, the worth of these arguments is heavily dependent on one’s view
of the relevance and merit of the underlying analogy. All of these
analogies will be imperfect since they rely on distinct constitutional
contexts, and one can rather easily pick and choose analogies to advance
one’s own policy interests.191 As a result, it is unclear that these
analogies really further the debate. Second, and more fundamentally,
the structural-analogy view offers an incomplete theory of the
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision. Structural analogies, by their
nature, can only answer the question of whether—yes or no—Copyright
Clause limitations should be applied externally. However, as Part III
argued, the answer to this question—“sometimes”—is already clear
from controlling Supreme Court precedents in the intellectual property
context; there is thus no need to rely on distinct areas of constitutional
jurisprudence. The true issue in the debate is when Copyright Clause
limitations will apply externally and when they will not, and structural
analogies do little to answer this critical question.
B. Textualist Theory
Another theory of the Copyright/Commerce Clause collision
examines the text of the Copyright Clause and attempts to distinguish
between two types of restrictions on enumerated powers: those that
represent a simple “lack of authority” to legislate, and those that are
“affirmative limitations” on constitutional power. Only the affirmative
limitations, the argument goes, will apply externally to uses of other
congressional powers. This “textualist” theory stems from an attempt to
reconcile the different outcomes in Gibbons and Heart of Atlanta,
relying on the following distinction.192 The Bankruptcy Clause’s
189. Patry, supra note 16, at 375–76, 395–97.
190. See Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellectual
Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar
Corp., 18 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 259, 270–74 (1995) (drawing comparison between Copyright Clause
and Tenth Amendment limitations on Commerce Clause power); Heald & Sherry, supra note 15, at
1124 (finding Tenth and Eleventh Amendment federalism decisions as “very instructive” with regard to
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision).
191. See Oliar, supra note 17, at 501 (“[C]ommentators applying structural inference [have]
reached opposite conclusions . . . based on the context from which they chose to analogize.”).
192. See Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining this argument).
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“uniform” requirement, at issue in Gibbons, is an affirmative limitation
on congressional power; it requires all bankruptcy laws to be uniform.193
In contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment—at issue in Heart of Atlanta—
contains no such express limitations; the “state action” requirement of
the Civil Rights Cases is merely a jurisdictional restriction that indicates
a lack of authority.194 As a result, the “uniformity” requirement applies
to exercises of other congressional powers, but the “state action”
requirement does not. This textualist argument was advanced forcefully
at the appellate level in Martignon,195 and some language in Moghadam
suggests reliance on the theory.196
The essential failure of the textualist approach is that it offers no clear
way to distinguish between affirmative limitations and jurisdictional
bounds on grants of power. Consider, for example, the Copyright
Clause’s provision that the rights secured be vested in “Authors,” which
has been interpreted to mean that only original works may be
copyrighted.197 On the one hand, it is easy to argue this is a Gibbonslike affirmative limitation—just as the Bankruptcy Clause requires
bankruptcy laws to be uniform, so the Copyright Clause requires
copyrighted works to be original. But one could just as easily argue that
“Authors” is a jurisdictional requirement. On this view, “Authors”
indicates that the Copyright Clause only covers original works, just as
the Fourteenth Amendment only relates to “state actions;” thus, the
Copyright Clause simply lacks authority over unoriginal works. This
insight has been stated more generally by Professor Nachbar: “Because
the federal government is one of enumerated powers, it is easy to restate
any ‘affirmative limitation’ on a grant of Congress’s power as a ‘lack of
authority to legislate,’ and vice versa.”198 In other words, any lack of
authority in an enumerated power functions as a limitation on
Congress’s power. Textualist theories thus offer little insight into which
exercises of Commerce Clause power will be subject to Copyright
Clause limitations.
C. Purpose-Based Approaches
A third group of theories answers the question of when the Copyright
193. See supra notes 104–110 (explaining the facts and holding of Gibbons).
194. See supra notes 97–103 (explaining the facts and holding of Heart of Atlanta).
195. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 145, 147–48.
196. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Copyright
Clause does not envision that Congress is positively forbidden from extending copyright-like protection
[to unfixed works]. The grant itself is stated in positive terms, and does not imply any negative pregnant
that suggests that the term “Writings” operates as a ceiling. . . .”).
197. See supra notes 53–58 (explaining the Feist decision).
198. Nachbar, supra note 15, at 295.
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Clause’s limitations ought to apply to the Commerce Clause by
reference to either the purposes underlying each grant of power, or
Congress’s aim in enacting the legislation at issue. Versions of this
approach abound in academic commentary.199 One variation on this
theory employs notions of purpose to classify legislation as an exercise
of one power or the other;200 another version incorporates purpose to
weigh the harm done to a particular clause’s goals against the valid
exercise of the other power.201
For example, Andrew Hetherington offers a straightforward version
of a purpose-based approach.202 Hetherington argues that the resolution
of the Copyright/Commerce Clause conflict lies in “the relationship
between the constitutional purposes of the respective clauses.”203
Determining whether Copyright Clause limitations apply will depend on
whether, for a given law, the purpose of “promot[ing] the Progress of
Science” under the Copyright Clause predominates over the purpose of
“enabling free trade” under the Commerce Clause.204
A more sophisticated version of a purpose-based approach was
articulated recently by Professor Jeanne Fromer. Professor Fromer’s
theory, like Hetherington’s, looks to the purpose of the challenged
legislation as triggering the limitations of the Copyright Clause: “when
legislation has the structural purpose of promoting the progress of
science and useful arts, it must restrict itself to the means specified in
the [Copyright] Clause.”205 There is an important caveat, however, for
laws that have multiple purposes. If clear and convincing evidence
shows that Congress intentionally chose to supersede the Copyright
Clause’s limitations pursuant to a legitimate, alternative purpose (say,
regulating a national economy), then the law is constitutional.206
Purpose-based approaches succeed in the abstract, in that they
articulate general principles which may yield an appropriate sphere of
199. See, e.g., Danitz, supra note 13, at 1149 (arguing that “Congress’ discretion to enact
copyright-like protections is restricted only where the ‘essential’ purpose of the Copyright Clause is
threatened”). See also infra notes 200–201 (citing to other purpose-based theories).
200. See Merschman, supra note 86, at 689 (“[T]he key question [in the Copyright/Commerce
Clause collision] is, under which power does this legislation truly belong? The answer to that question
lies in the purposes behind different powers.”).
201. See Bathaee, supra note 13, at 507 (advocating a balancing test that weighs “how vital the
doctrine being circumvented is to the constitutional provision in which it originates from . . . against the
burden it will place on the [other] constitutional power”).
202. See generally Andrew M. Hetherington, Comment, Constitutional Purpose and Inter-Clause
Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on Congress by the Copyright Clause, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 457 (2003).
203. Id. at 460.
204. Id. at 504–05.
205. Fromer, supra note 15, at 1333.
206. Fromer, supra note 15, at 1376–77.
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applicability for the Copyright Clause’s limitations. But a purposebased approach simply shifts the existing debate to a different level:
What are, precisely, the purposes of the Copyright and Commerce
Clauses? The text of the Copyright Clause offers some guidance, in that
its preamble specifies its intention that Congress may act only “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”207 But the Copyright
Clause is unusual in this respect; the Commerce Clause states only that
Congress may “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”208 Is
its purpose to create a uniform commercial law? To promote economic
prosperity? The history of each clause’s enactment and common law
background will provide some answers to these questions, of course,
though they are likely to be contested ones.
Even more contentious will be the inquiry as to when one clause’s
purpose should “take precedence” over another,209 how to classify
congressional action with multiple purposes,210 or when a particular
piece of legislation is so violative of the Copyright Clause’s purposes so
as to prohibit reliance on another power.211 For example, consider
federal trade secret legislation. Is the purpose of such protection to
promote fair competition (presumably a legitimate Commerce clause
aim) or to encourage innovation (in which case Copyright Clause limits
apply)?212 There is no obvious answer. Similar indeterminacy arises
when purpose-based views are applied to the anti-bootlegging statutes.
In the view of some commentators, these statutes “complement”
Copyright Clause purposes by protecting unfixed as well as fixed
works;213 according to others, they undermine core copyright values by
granting perpetual protection without requiring creation of a fixed copy
to fall into the public domain.214 At best, a purpose-based approach runs
a risk of being indeterminate; at worst, looking to debatable notions of
purpose may invite courts to impose their normative view of a piece of
207. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
209. See Hetherington, supra note 202, at 505 (advocating case-by-case approach in which courts
determine which clause’s purpose “takes precedence over the other”).
210. See Fromer, supra note 15, at 1376–77 (proposing burden-shifting framework for evaluating
constitutionality of laws with multiple purposes).
211. See Bathaee, supra note 13, at 507 (advocating a balancing test in which courts engage in
such an inquiry).
212. See S. REP. NO. 104-359, § 2 (1996) (describing purposes of EEA as both to protect
proprietary commercial information from misappropriation, and to secure exclusive rights in authors).
213. See Giuliano, supra note 13, at 377 (“Properly understood, the federal anti-bootlegging
statute protects copyright, commerce, and free speech concerns by complementing, rather than
undermining, the Copyright Clause.”).
214. See Merschman, supra note 86, at 681–89 (arguing that the fixation requirement is a
constitutional, fundamental part of Copyright Clause purposes which Congress can not avoid through
reliance on Commerce Clause power).
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legislation into the Copyright/Commerce Clause inquiry.
D. Values-Based Theories
The next group of theories attempts to identify particular normative
value(s) that, when implicated, mandate the external application of
Copyright Clause limitations. This Part reviews three such theories, one
drawn from the case law and two others that have been advanced in
leading law review articles.
1. “Fundamental Inconsistency”
The Moghadam court—the first modern court to be confronted with
the Copyright/Commerce Clause collision—summarized its conclusions
in the following language: “[T]he Commerce Clause can provide the
source of Congressional power in this case because the extension of
copyright-like protection here is not fundamentally inconsistent with the
fixation requirement of the Copyright Clause.”215 This “fundamentally
inconsistent” test has since become a common view in the case law.
The decisions in KISS II, Elcom, and the district court in Martignon
have all relied upon notions of fundamental inconsistency in their
analysis.216
Despite its prevalence, “fundamental inconsistency” has been given
no agreed-upon substantive meaning, causing courts to fall back on
other approaches. Most of the analysis in Moghadam relied on textual
notions to reach its conclusion, arguing that “Writings,” properly
understood, was not an “affirmative limitation” at all.217 In contrast,
Elcom looked to the purposes of the Copyright and Commerce Clauses
and the DMCA’s copyright-related costs and benefits.218 The district
court in Martignon—perhaps recognizing the ambiguous nature of the
phrase—appeared to equate “fundamentally inconsistent” and
“inconsistent,” finding the Moghadam test satisfied because the
Copyright Clause required a durational limitation and anti-bootlegging

215. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
216. See KISS II, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Even if a ‘fundamental conflict’
with the Copyright Clause would invalidate the Statute, none exists here.”); Martignon SDNY, 346 F.
Supp. 2d 413, 428–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (arguing that anti-bootlegging statute is “fundamentally
inconsistent” with Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” requirement); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203
F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1138–41 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (stating and applying test of “whether the DMCA is
nevertheless ‘irreconcilably inconsistent’ with a limitation contained within the Intellectual Property
Clause.”).
217. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280.
218. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1138–41.
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statute did not have one.219 But a simple “inconsistency” test will
always result in a finding of unconstitutionality. Any instance of a
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision necessarily involves an
inconsistency, in that the Copyright Clause contains a limitation or
requirement that the legislation at issue fails to satisfy.
Without more substantive content, the “fundamental inconsistency”
test does little more than restate the problem. Because any instance of a
Copyright/Commerce Clause conflict involves an “inconsistency,” the
crux of the issue is when this inconsistency is “fundamental.”
Answering that question would seem to require reliance on some outside
authority—the purpose, text, or history of the Copyright and Commerce
Clauses, policy judgments, etc. Typically, then, the invocation of a
“fundamental inconsistency” test merely masks reliance on one of the
other theories presented in this Part, or a court’s normative approval or
disapproval of the legislation. The array of differing conclusions in the
case law about which conflicts are or are not “fundamental” provides
strong evidence for this conclusion.220
2. “Constitutional Norms”
Professor Thomas Nachbar, in one of the leading articles on the
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision, argues that Copyright Clause
limitations do not in any way restrain Congress’s exercise of Commerce
Clause power.221 Nachbar’s theory draws a line between constitutional
limitations like the First Amendment, or notions of federalism found in
the Tenth Amendment—which, he agrees, are generally applicable to all
exercises of Congressional power222—and many other limitations in
enumerated powers that do not merit such external application. For
example, the Piracy Clause grants Congress the power to punish
“Felonies committed on the high Seas,”223 but no one seriously suggests
this phrase limits the ability of Congress to punish land-based felonies
pursuant to its Commerce powers.224 The distinguishing factor between
these two extremes, in Nachbar’s view, is the notion of a “constitutional
norm,” which he defines as “a rule required by and even inherent in the
form of government adopted in the Constitution.”225 Nachbar’s central
219. Martignon SDNY, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 428–29.
220. See infra notes 131–157.
221. See Nachbar, supra note 15, at 277 (“The Intellectual Property Clause and its limits do not
represent generally applicable constitutional norms and Congress may therefore legislate pursuant to the
Commerce Clause without regard to the Intellectual Property Clause or its limits.”).
222. Id. at 291, 297 (noting these provisions are applied to all exercises of congressional power).
223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
224. Nachbar, supra note 15, at 295.
225. Id. at 317.
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claim is that only limitations which rise to the level of a constitutional
norm merit external application. After an examination of the history of
the Copyright Clause, Nachbar concludes it contains no such
constitutional norms, and so the limitations of the Copyright Clause
have no relevance to exercises of Commerce Clause power to enact
copyright-like legislation.226
Though Nachbar makes a forceful case for his conclusion, there are
several problems in his analysis. First, as noted above, it is rather
difficult to understand the holdings of Supreme Court precedents like
Dastar, Feist, and Graham on a complete independence-of-powers view
(which, functionally, Nachbar’s argument represents).227 Gibbons
presents particular problems for Nachbar, though he takes pains to
attempt to distinguish the case.228 Given the result in Gibbons, Nachbar
concedes—as he must—that the Bankruptcy Clause’s “uniformity”
requirement represents a “constitutional norm.”229 But if uniform
bankruptcy laws are “inherent in the form of government adopted in the
Constitution,” it is hard to see why, for example, time-limited copyright
laws are not equally inherent.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Nachbar’s analysis is that his allor-nothing framing of the question seems tailored to lead to his
conclusion. As alluded to above,230 Nachbar is correct to consider the
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision as a question of when limitations
will be externally applied. However, there is no a priori basis to
conclude that limitations on enumerated powers must be divided into
only two groups, those which are constitutional norms (and so externally
applicable to all exercises of congressional power), and those which are
not (and so never externally applicable). No one seriously contends
that, for example, the “limited Times” provision of the Copyright Clause
means that all congressional actions shall be durationally-limited in the
same way that the First Amendment implies that all congressional action
not abridge the freedom of speech. The claim, rather, is that the
Copyright Clause’s limitations should apply to some limited sphere of
congressional action within the clause’s purview. In short, there is no
reason to believe that a limitation must rise to the level of a
226. See id. at 329–50, 361 (examining history surrounding enactment of Intellectual Property
Clause and concluding “there is no way to locate in either Supreme Court precedent or constitutional
history a sufficiently strong countervailing constitutional norm to warrant the external application of the
Intellectual Property Clause’s limits”).
227. See supra Part III.A (detailing difficulties of reconciling an independence-of-powers view
with prominent Supreme Court precedents).
228. Nachbar, supra note 15, at 314–17.
229. See id. at 316–17 (“[T]he Court [in Gibbons] perceived the uniformity requirement as
mirroring an explicit (and therefore generally applicable) limitation . . . .”).
230. See supra Part III.B.
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constitutional norm to be, in some limited degree, externally applicable.
3. Fundamental Intellectual Property Principles
A final values-based theory—prominently advanced by Professors
Heald and Sherry231—looks to “principles” embodied in the Copyright
Clause to define certain limitations which absolutely constrain
congressional power.232
Relying on history and common law
surrounding the enactment of the Constitution, Heald and Sherry find
four “principles of constitutional weight” embedded in the Copyright
Clause. These principles, they argue, cannot be violated by Congress in
the exercise of any of its powers.233 The first such principle—termed
the “Suspect Grant Principle”—provides a jurisdictional restriction on
the theory: the limitations defined by the other three principles apply
only to “legislation that imposes monopoly-like costs on the public
through the granting of exclusive rights.”234 The other three principles
define substantive limits when Congress acts in this area, and require
that (1) exclusive rights only be granted if the public secures a
countervailing benefit in return (the Quid Pro Quo Principle);235 (2)
rights may only be granted to authors of new creation (the Authorship
Principle);236 and (3) the public domain must remain inviolate (the
Public Domain Principle).237
Heald and Sherry amass an impressive quantity of historical evidence
in support of their conclusions.238 Functionally, their “Suspect Grant
Principle” may operate in much the same way as the subject matter

231. See generally Heald & Sherry, supra note 15.
232. There is some superficial similarity between the approach of Heald and Sherry and the
purpose-based approaches discussed in Part IV.C, supra, in that both inquire into underlying policies
behind the Copyright Clause. However, Heald and Sherry’s analysis is far more complete than the
typical invocation of “purpose,” in that they have completely specified the values they believe are
involved. Thus, I have chosen to classify their argument as a “values-based” approach, though, of
course, the lines between these categories are to some degree artificial.
233. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 15, at 1123 (“[W]e examine the underlying history and
structure of the Intellectual Property Clause in order to determine which of its limits are so fundamental
that they should absolutely constrain Congress’s power . . . we call [these limitations] ‘principles of
constitutional weight.’”).
234. Id. at 1160.
235. See id. at 1162 (“Congress may grant exclusive rights only if the grant is an attempt to secure
a countervailing benefit to the public. We refer to this as the Quid Pro Quo Principle.”).
236. See id. at 1164 (“[T]he Authorship Principle demands that Congress initially direct exclusive
grants to those who provide the public with the new creation.”).
237. See id. at 1165 (“The principle of an inviolable public domain is the necessary implication of
the constant emphasis in history and in precedent—and in the wording of the Clause itself—on the
requirement that grants be for a limited time.”).
238. See id. at 1130–60 (examining wide array of historical sources to support proffered principles
of constitutional weight).
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approach for which this Article advocates. But it will do so in a
curiously circuitous and needless complex manner, as Heald and
Sherry’s three substantive principles appear to largely trace the
limitations traditionally understood to be embodied in the language of
the Copyright Clause.239 Resort to “fundamental principles” derived
from historical analysis is not needed when one can reach the same
result directly from the text of the Copyright Clause. For example,
recourse to a historical “Authorship Principle” is unnecessary when one
can simply cite the express text of the Copyright Clause, which provides
that rights be granted only to “Authors.” Moreover, reliance on
contested historical analysis—as opposed to express textual command—
may run a risk of undermining the intellectual property principles Heald
and Sherry clearly believe in. Despite this non-trivial difference in
form, however, the Heald and Sherry theory will often, in practice, reach
similar conclusions as the subject matter approach for which this Article
advocates.
E. Subject Matter Approaches
The last group of theories defines when Copyright Clause limitations
will apply externally by reference to the material being regulated and the
specific rights granted over that material, that is, the subject matter of
the challenged law.
An expansive subject matter approach is
exemplified by the district court opinion in Martignon, which held
Copyright Clause limitations applicable whenever a piece of legislation
is “copyright-like.”240 The problem with this approach—depending on
how broadly the phrase “copyright-like” is defined—is that, taken
literally, it would seem to render federal trademark and trade secret
protection unconstitutional.241
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Martignon relied on a narrower
subject-matter-based approach, holding that Copyright Clause
limitations apply only to “copyright laws,” which it defines as acts
which “create, bestow, or allocate property rights in expression.”242
239. See supra notes 24–31 and accompanying text (explaining four limitations generally
understood to be required by the text of the Copyright Clause).
240. See Martignon SDNY, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“In order to give
meaning to the express limitations provided in the Copyright Clause, when enacting copyright-like
legislation . . . Congress may not . . . enact the law under a separate grant of power . . . .”).
241. See supra Part III.B.
242. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 150 (2d Cir. 2007). The Martignon court took pains to note that it
did not mean to “cast doubt” upon the constitutionality of the Lanham Act with this definition, even
though the Act “might be thought to allocate property rights in (unoriginal) expression.” See Martignon,
492 F.3d at 150 n.6. The Martignon court indicated it did not believe the Lanham Act could be
considered a “copyright law” under this definition, though it did not elaborate on its reasoning. Id. For
an explanation for why federal trademark law should not be considered a “copyright law” under the
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Following on the Martignon decision, Professor Aaron Perzanowski has
articulated a categorical subject matter approach, arguing that Copyright
Clause limitations apply whenever Congress grants “exclusive rights in
expression.”243 For the reasons expressed in the next Part, this Article
agrees that a subject matter approach offers the best resolution of the
conflict between the Copyright and Commerce Clause. However, the
shortcoming of both Martignon and Perzanowski’s formulation is that
they leave the precise scope of “exclusive rights in expression”
undefined, leading to sharply different results in the application of their
tests.244 By contrast, this Article’s proposal offers a more nuanced
subject matter test, articulating several factors that determine when a
law grants property rights in expression. The details of this proposal are
explored in the next Part.
V. DEFINING THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE’S SUBJECT MATTER
This Part justifies and elaborates upon the subject matter approach.
The first section argues that tying Copyright Clause limitations to a
limited subject matter is a workable approach which offers the most
defensible understanding of key precedents. Functionally, it operates to
protect core copyright values within their traditional sphere, preventing
the dilution that might result from broader applicability. The second
section more fully elaborates on the factors that constitute the “copyright
law” inquiry: the activities proscribed, the material protected, and the
specific rights granted.
A. The Virtues of a Subject Matter Approach
1. Protecting Constitutional Copyright Principles
Courts and commentators who oppose the anti-bootlegging statutes or
database protection frequently remark that allowing Congress to rely on
the Commerce Clause to uphold copyright-like legislation would write
the limitations of the Copyright Clause out of the Constitution.245 This
reducio ad absurdum argument relies upon the canon of statutory
subject matter approach, see infra Part VI.A.
243. Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Penumbral Public Domain: Constitutional Limits on QuasiCopyright Legislation, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1081 (2008).
244. See id. at 1140–43 (criticizing the Martignon decision as failing to “faithfully appl[y]” the
subject matter test when it concluded that the criminal anti-bootlegging statute was not a “copyright
law”).
245. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 13, at 744 (“If this [independence-of-powers] line of reasoning
were applied as a blanket rule, the Commerce Clause would render useless many provisions of the
Constitution.”).
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construction that one part of a law should not be construed so as to
render another part superfluous.246 Taken literally, this argument proves
too much. At its core, it is really an argument against modern,
expansive interpretations of the Commerce Clause power, which have
undeniably rendered some Article I powers superfluous.247 Whatever
one’s views on the original intent of the Commerce power, national
economic regulation by Congress is a reality.
As a result, those who wish to maintain any effective constitutional
force to the Copyright Clause’s limitations are best served by cabining
their claims to a limited, well-defined area. Defining a sphere of subject
matter through a “copyright law” test is a natural, intuitive way to
achieve this. A subject matter test will focus principally on the means—
and not the ends—of the congressional action, and thus will not unduly
restrict Congress’s broad powers to regulate commerce. For example, if
Congress, in the exercise of its economic prerogatives, chooses to
encourage database creation, it may do so in a variety of ways: tax
benefits, criminal penalties, or even something like trade secret
protection (which targets misappropriation—not simple copying—and
has distinct prerequisites to protection248). The only thing it may not do
is generally prohibit copying by granting individuals property rights in
the expression—i.e., create a “copyright law” for unoriginal works.
The Copyright Clause indeed expresses the balance struck by the
Framers between incentives to create and public access, but does so in a
particular regulatory area.249 Expanding the well-defined limitations of
the Copyright Clause to a wide subject matter area may,
counterintuitively, risk undermining them. For example, imagine that
The Trade-Mark Cases had upheld the Trade-Mark Act of 1876 under
Copyright Clause power, but only insofar as it protected marks that were
“original.” A predictable consequence of this system would be a
loosening of notions of originality, as courts stretch the originality
doctrine to cover moderately creative marks like, say, “Tide Detergent,”
seeking to vindicate the expectations and investment of the first
registrant, facilitate commerce, and avoid consumer confusion. These
246. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory
construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”) (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533
U.S. 167, 121 (2001)).
247. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5 (granting Congress power “[t]o coin Money”). Since
money is an “instrumentality of interstate commerce,” regulation of money would seem well within the
modern scope of the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
248. Trade secret protection typically requires that the information protected be “nonpublic” (that
is, a secret) and that “reasonable measures to keep such information secret” be employed. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012) (defining “trade secret” as used in the Economic Espionage Act of 1996).
249. See KISS II, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“[T]he Copyright Clause allows
Congress to protect a narrowly defined subject matter within defined parameters.”).
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diluted notions of originality would then risk importation into the
traditional realm of copyright laws.
Similarly, arguing that all Copyright Clause limitations must apply
when Congress seeks to protect databases or live musical performance
(regardless of the form of protection) may risk watering down these
limitations, as courts bend doctrine so as to avoid the grave act of
invalidating majoritarian legislation. For example, if protection for live
musical performances could only be had via the Copyright Clause, a
court may well interpret “Writings” not to require fixation in order to
avoid striking down an act of Congress; this holding, though designed to
solve a particular pragmatic problem, would have ramifications
throughout the whole of copyright law. Thus, keeping the Copyright
Clause tethered to a narrow area of “copyright laws” actually promotes
Copyright Clause values by maintaining robust notions of originality,
fixation, and so on, within their traditional sphere.
2. Consistency with Precedent
Another advantage of the subject matter approach is its convincing
reconciliation of the leading Supreme Court cases, Gibbons and The
Trade-Mark Cases.250 Recall that The Trade-Mark Cases, considering
whether trademark legislation was within Congress’s powers, looked
without any comment to the Commerce Clause as an alternate source of
authority, while Gibbons held a similar move was not possible in the
context of the RITA bankruptcy law. The Second Circuit in Martignon
explained the line between these two decisions as follows:
The Gibbons Court considered primarily what RITA did, not Congress’s
belief as to which clause authorized its action. RITA mandated that an
existing bankruptcy proceeding be handled differently from any other
bankruptcy in the United States. It also altered the statutory priorities for
paying debts and the administrative scheme contemplated by the
Bankruptcy Code. . . . The Gibbons Court found that RITA was actually
a bankruptcy law, not that it was . . . bankruptcy-like.251

This distinction goes a long way to understanding the inter-Clause
collision precedent. The Trade-Mark Cases dealt with legislation that
was, at most, copyright-like. Though trademarks grant exclusionary
rights to individuals, the activity proscribed—confusing use of another’s
mark in commerce—is distinct from the key copyright right, a general
prohibition on unauthorized reproduction.252 In contrast, it is hard to see

250. See supra Part II.B.1 (reviewing the facts and holdings of these cases).
251. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
252. See infra Part VI.A (explaining in greater detail why trademarks are not “copyright laws”).
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how RITA is not a bankruptcy statute: it changed the priority of
repayment (the key feature of bankruptcy law) in a bankruptcy
proceeding.
Note that this analysis does not foreclose Congress from achieving
the result it intended in RITA—securing economic benefits for
employees laid off by a bankrupt railroad—through other types of
legislation. Congress would be free to pass an unemployment benefits
package, create a special civil tort action, or offer tax refunds to the
employees. Congress might even pass a special tax transferring wealth
from the creditors at issue to the employees—though such an act might
not survive Takings Clause scrutiny,253 it is hard to see why it would
present problems under the Bankruptcy Clause. On this reading, the
core statement of Gibbons is “Congress may not pass a nonuniform
bankruptcy law.” Similarly, Congress may not pass, for example, a
temporally-unlimited copyright law. However, it may (as The TradeMark Cases implicitly held) pass temporally-unlimited legislation that
does not have the core features of a copyright law.
3. Workability and Definiteness
In contrast to several of the competing theories,254 the “copyright
law” test is a simple, reasonably definite approach. Instead of relying
on, for example, highly contested notions of congressional purpose, or
whether values or inconsistencies are “fundamental,” the “copyright
law” test relies on concepts—the activities proscribed, the material
protected, and the character of the rights granted255—which are clear
from the face of the statute at issue. Further, the central focus of the
inquiry draws on traditional intellectual property notions—like
exclusive, individual property rights—with which judges are already
familiar and, often, have well-established meanings in existing copyright
doctrine. Though there will inevitably be gray areas at the margin, the
subject matter approach promises a clear, workable inquiry.
4. Empty Formalism?
One primary objection to the subject matter approach is that it is a
highly formalist theory: what Congress may or may not do depends on
how it chooses to act, not on the ultimate results or purposes of its
253. The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause prohibits private property from being taken “for
public use” without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend V.
254. See supra Part IV.A–D (reviewing four theories of the Copyright/Commerce Clause
collision).
255. See infra Part IV.B (defining each of these inquiries).
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action. For example, as we shall see below,256 the subject matter
approach advanced here means that Congress may prevent bootlegging
of live musical performances through criminal penalties, but not civil
liability. The theory is admittedly a formalistic one, but this is largely
by design:257 it is a formalistic solution to a formalistic problem. This
approach finds support in South Dakota v. Dole,258 a Supreme Court
case on a different conflict of powers that is often overlooked in
examining the Copyright/Commerce Clause collision.
The
constitutional provisions at issue in Dole were the 21st Amendment—
which has been interpreted to reserve to the states broad powers over the
regulation of alcohol259—and Congress’s spending power.260 Pursuant
to its spending power, Congress enacted a law which denied states
federal highway funds if they did not set the minimum drinking age at
21 years or higher.261 South Dakota—whose laws allowed 19- and 20year-olds to buy low-alcohol beer—relied on the 21st Amendment to
challenge the federal law as beyond Congress’s power.262 The Court
held that the conditioning of federal funds was valid “even if Congress
may not regulate drinking ages directly.”263
The lesson of Dole is that Congress may often accomplish an
objective indirectly, even when the Constitution appears to forbid the
most direct means to achieve that goal. This formalism does not make
the language of the 21st Amendment—or of the Copyright Clause—into
dead letter law. The reason, of course, is that different means of
congressional action carry different political costs, and so a restraint on
means may well change the legislative outcome. Take the antibootlegging statutes as an example. Though Congress easily passed
both criminal and civil penalties against bootlegging, it is easy to
imagine a world in which the political capital exists to create civil
remedies for bootlegging, but Congress is unwilling to bring down the
heavy arm of the criminal law on tens of thousands of (voting) Phish

256. See infra Part VI.D (analyzing the anti-bootlegging statutes under a “copyright law” test).
257. See supra Part V.A.1 (explaining how the formalistic nature of the “copyright law” inquiry
prevents undue encroachment on Congress’s broad power over commerce so as not to undermine
Copyright Clause limitations).
258. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
259. See id. at 205; California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97, 110 (1980) (“The Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control over whether
to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.”).
260. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare
of the United States . . . .”).
261. See 23 U.S.C § 158 (2012).
262. Dole, 483 U.S. at 205.
263. Id. at 206.
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fans.264 Further, two given means will rarely be identical ways of
achieving a result. Again using civil versus criminal enforcement as a
comparison, the government must exercise prosecutorial discretion and
expend government resources in enforcing criminal law; such choices
are entirely left to private actors in the civil context.
B. “Copyright Laws”: Core Factors
The Second Circuit in Martignon defined “copyright laws” as
legislative acts which “create, bestow, or allocate property rights in
expression.”265 While this is a fine starting point, Martignon did not
offer an expansive definition of these terms. This section fills that gap
by elaborating the key elements of the “copyright law” inquiry: the
activity proscribed, the material protected, and the nature of the rights
granted. The general “copyright law” approach will be a kind of
balancing test which weighs the degree of similarity or dissimilarity
across these factors. While strict identity of each element is not required
to make an act of Congress a “copyright law,” a significant difference in
even a single factor may be enough to make a law merely copyrightlike.
1. Caveats
a. Avoiding Circularity
At the outset, it is important to observe a critical caveat to the analysis
that follows: The express limitations in the Copyright Clause—i.e.,
limited times, originality, and fixation—may not themselves be relied
upon to define what constitutes a “copyright law.” To do so would deny
any applicability to the limitations of the Copyright Clause, as the
alleged constitutional deficiency of a piece of legislation could be relied
upon to save it. For example, opponents of anti-bootlegging statutes
argue that the laws are unconstitutional because they protect unfixed
artistic works in violation of the Copyright Clause’s command that
rights may be secured in “Writings” only.266 Under the approach for
which this Article advocates, the resolution of this argument will hinge
264. Phish is an American rock band known for a devoted fan base that makes recordings of their
live performances. See Wikipedia.com, Phish – Live performances, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phish
(last visited February 5, 2013) (“Phish fans have been noted for their extensive collections of fan-taped
concert recordings . . . .”).
265. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 150 (2d Cir. 2007).
266. See supra Part II.A.4 (presenting argument that the anti-bootlegging statutes are
unconstitutional).
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on whether the anti-bootlegging statutes are “copyright laws.” To
maintain that the anti-bootlegging statutes are not copyright laws
because copyright laws protect only fixed works (or only original works,
or protect only in a time-limited manner) simply begs the question.
Courts have generally recognized the “circuitous” nature of such
analysis and rejected these arguments.267
b. “Copyright Law” as a Term of Art
Secondly, it is critical to note that the term “copyright law” is
employed here as a term of art for purposes of analyzing the
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision. In this context, “copyright law”
is used to delineate what this Article has referred to previously as a
“sphere of applicability”268 for the Copyright Clause’s limitations: that
is, those laws which are so similar to core copyright protection that they
must comply with the Copyright Clause’s limitations. In order to avoid
unduly trammeling Congress’s power to regulate national commerce—
and thus preserve the robust limitations of the Copyright Clause within
their traditional sphere269—the definition of “copyright law” that follows
is a carefully circumscribed conception, incorporating only the most
central elements of copyright law. For example, the definition focuses
principally on the proscription against unauthorized reproduction when
discussing the actions proscribed by copyright,270 though many other
acts—such as unauthorized creation of derivative works, or
unauthorized public performance—are proscribed by the modern
copyright statute. 271
To be clear, “copyright law,” as used below, is not meant to represent
the limits of Congress’s powers under the Copyright Clause. Obviously,
in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause,272 Congress
possesses broad powers to enact laws in the area of intellectual property.
267. See Martignon SDNY, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The government
argues, circuitously, that because the anti-bootlegging statute regulates a subject matter, live
performances, that is not copyrightable—by virtue of the lack of fixation and durational limitation—
Congress was not bound by the Copyright Clause’s restrictions. I find this argument to be wholly
unconvincing.”).
268. See supra Part III (arguing that, to be consistent with Supreme Court precedent, any theory
of Copyright/Commerce Clause collision must delineate some limited sphere in which the Copyright
Clause’s limitations will be externally applied).
269. See supra Part V.A.1 (arguing that limited subject matter approach operates to preserve
traditional Copyright Clause values and limitations by not stretching them beyond the traditional realm).
270. See infra Part V.B.2.
271. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (listing exclusive rights of copyright holders).
272. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421
(1819) (defining “necessary and proper” broadly, to include all “appropriate” means to achieve an end
that is legitimate, and within the scope of the Constitution).
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Thus, for example, the Copyright Act of 1976’s criminal enforcement
provisions273 are easily a proper exercise of Copyright Clause powers
even though they do not “secure[e] . . . Right[s]”274 in any individual—
enforcement is left to the government.275 Criminal copyright provisions
are thus within the Copyright Clause power, even though they are not a
“copyright law” as the term is used below. But however broad the scope
of Congress’s necessary and proper powers under the Copyright Clause,
they cannot be used to enact laws which defy the express restrictions of
the Copyright Clause.276 It is those laws which fail to satisfy a
Copyright Clause limitation—and must be justified, if at all, under a
different enumerated power—that are subject to the “copyright law”
inquiry that follows.
2. What Actions are Proscribed
A natural way to begin the “copyright law” inquiry is to look to the
particular actions the law at issue proscribes. Though the modern
copyright statute provides a variety of actionable violations—
prohibiting, inter alia, the unauthorized public performance or public
display of a copyrighted work277—the key proscription is the first listed:
the reproduction of a copyrighted work without consent of the copyright
holder.278 The first Copyright Act of 1790—the prototypical “copyright
law” for constitutional purposes—unsurprisingly focused its
prohibitions against unauthorized reproduction.279 Copyright laws, as
their name suggests, are an exclusive right in copying. Thus, before
delving into the more nuanced inquiries of the “copyright law” test, it is
an often helpful heuristic to ask the simple question: does the law at
issue proscribe copying, or another activity? The answer to this
question should not necessarily be determinative—as property rights in
273. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012) (providing for criminal penalties for “willful” infringement of
a copyright for commercial gain).
274. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
275. See infra Part V.B.4 (arguing that criminal laws cannot be considered “copyright“ laws
because they grant rights to punish to the government, not possessory rights to individuals).
276. It should be noted here that the criminal copyright provisions do not flout any of the
Copyright Clause’s restrictions. Unlike the criminal anti-bootlegging statutes, they are time-limited, see
17 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2012) (establishing five-year statute of limitations for criminal copyright
infringement), and protect only original, fixed works, see id. § 506(a)(1) (limiting scope of criminal
provisions to willful infringement of a “copyright” under the usual provision of Title 17).
277. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)–(5) (2012).
278. See id. § 106(1) (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights
to . . . reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords.”).
279. “Vending” the copyrighted work was also prohibited. See Act of May 30, 1790, ch. 15, 1
Stat. 124 (repealed 1831) (providing copyright holders “shall have the sole right and liberty of printing,
reprinting, publishing and vending” copyrighted works).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014

47

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 1

48

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

expression may be secured in other ways280—but looking to the activity
proscribed provides a useful touchstone for the “copyright law” inquiry.
3. The Material Protected
The next step in the inquiry is to look at the material granted
protection under the law.
Copyright laws provide rights in
expression.281 The categories of works copyrightable under federal law
have expanded greatly since the time of the Constitution,282 but all share
common, expressive features as the “Writings” of “Authors.”283 The
first federal copyright law limited itself to charts, maps, and books.284
Later acts of Congress extended protection to musical compositions,285
photographic works,286 and the fine arts.287 The modern copyright
statute covers several broad categories such as literary, musical,
dramatic, and pictorial works.288 These are all canonical forms of
artistic expression. “Expression,” for our purposes, may be defined
broadly as the “fruits of intellectual or artistic labor.”289
When considering the “material protected” factor, one must be careful
to avoid the circularity issues discussed in more detail above.290 Though
it may seem natural to read requirements of originality (or fixation) into
this usage of the word “expression,” such affirmative limitations of the
Copyright Clause should not be incorporated into the “copyright law”
test. To do so would allow the very reasons that the law is suspect in the
first instance to save it from Copyright Clause scrutiny.
4. The Nature of the Rights Granted
The final—and perhaps most important—element of the “copyright
280. The Martignon court recognized this point when it noted that “the word ‘copyright’ does not
appear in [the Copyright Clause]. . . . The clause thus empowers Congress to ‘secur[e] . . . Right[s].’”
Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 150 (2d Cir. 2007).
281. See id. (“[Copyright laws] all seem to share a common feature: They allocate rights in
expression.”).
282. See generally R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History,
30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 135–40 (2007) (providing a brief overview of evolution of copyrightable
subject matter from the Statute of Anne to 1909).
283. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
284. Act of May 30, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831).
285. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (repealed 1870).
286. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13 Stat. 540, 540 (repealed 1870).
287. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909).
288. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
289. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (“[T]he word ‘writings’ . . . may be
interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”).
290. See supra Part V.B.1.a.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/1

48

Hickey: Copyright/Commerce Clause Collision: A Subject Matter Approach

2013]

THE COPYRIGHT/COMMERCE CLAUSE COLLISION

49

law” test looks to the character of the rights granted by the law. This
inquiry may be subdivided into three components: (1) whether the
interest granted is a property right; (2) to whom the right is granted; and
(3) the scope of the right granted.
The rights secured through copyright laws are fundamentally property
rights.291 As a consequence, the rights will typically be exclusionary
and transferable,292 two features which are deeply embedded into current
federal copyright law.293 Non-exclusive rights do not trigger the kind of
government-backed monopoly (and monopoly costs) that so concerned
the Framers of the Copyright Clause.294 Transferability, while perhaps
less central to the inquiry, is a traditional indicia of a property right.
Also critical will be to whom the rights are granted. Property rights
are usually located in an individual or corporation. If a law instead
grants a right to the government, it is unlikely to be a property (and thus
a copyright) law. For example, laws granting protection enforced only
through criminal enforcement are difficult to characterize as “property
rights.” Such rights are not “owned” by anyone; they are given force
only at the discretion of the government, not a private possessor of the
right. Criminal laws function as an expression of social or moral
opprobrium,295 giving the government a right to punish a misdeed, rather
than as an allocation of an exclusive possessory interest.
Finally, as should be apparent from the analysis thus far, the purview
of copyright is quite broad. That is, copyright laws, typically, are
generalized rights against unauthorized reproduction. The existence of
restrictions which limit the scope of the protection granted to a narrow
area may thus serve to distinguish copyright laws from the mere
copyright-like. A comparison of copyright with trademark law is
291. I use the term “property” here in its more traditional, limited sense of transferable and
exclusive rights to “possess, use or enjoy a determinate thing.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (9th
ed. 2009). Broader notions of “new property”—like an expectation in the receipt of government
benefits, protected under the 5th and 14th Amendments as a property “interest,” see, e.g., Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976)—will typically not be considered “property rights” for our purposes.
See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (recognizing government
largess as an increasingly important form of property).
292. See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1075, 1079 (1997) (defining property as “one person’s full and exclusive right to use, enjoy, and transfer
a tangible thing”).
293. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2012) (providing that “a copyright may be transferred in whole or
in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law”); id. § 106 (granting copyright holder series
of “exclusive rights”).
294. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 15, at 1160–62 (explaining that Framers of the Constitution
deeply distrusted governmental grants of exclusive rights which imposed monopoly costs on the public).
295. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life Of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029,
2075–76 (2005) (“[A] criminal law typically carries with it a fairly high level of moral opprobrium. In
contrast, one may often incur private law liability without triggering moral opprobrium.”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
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instructive on this point. Holding a valid trademark does not prevent
others from copying or using the mark generally. Rather, exclusive
rights adhere only when others use the mark, in commerce, in a way
likely to create confusion among consumers.296 Trademarks are thus
specialized, narrow grants of rights against particular uses in
commerce.297 This is one reason why, historically, they were viewed as
a tort of unfair competition, rather than as intellectual property.298
VI. APPLYING THE THEORY
This Part applies the “copyright law” test derived above to the four
areas of the Copyright/Commerce Clause collision that were discussed
in the first section of this Article: trademarks, database protection, the
DMCA, and the anti-bootlegging statutes.
A. Trademarks
As the preceding discussion has already made clear,299 trademark
protection cannot be considered a “copyright law.” To be sure,
trademark laws do possess some of the indicia of copyright laws.
Trademarks are property rights granted to an individual, which are,
within their (narrow) scope, exclusive and transferable.300 Much of the
material protected by trademark can be considered expression, in that
marks often incorporate pictorial and/or literary elements. Further,
trademark laws might be said to proscribe some reproductions of a
registered mark, in the sense that copying a mark, under certain
conditions, triggers liability. However, what is truly proscribed by
296. See Patry, supra note 16, at 391 (“[T]rademark laws . . . are directed at redressing consumer
confusion over the origin of products. . . . The focus of trademark protection is not on design qua design
(i.e., as a “writing”), but rather on design as a source identifier.”).
297. A similar analysis may be made with regard to federal trade secret law. Federal trade secret
protection prohibits unauthorized copying of a trade secret only if the misappropriator has “intent to
convert a trade secret” for economic gain to a non-owner. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2012). To be considered
a “trade secret” under the EEA, the information must be nonpublic and economically valuable, and the
owner must employ reasonable measures be taken to maintain its secrecy. Id. § 1839(3). In sum, like
trademark, the protection granted is thus considerably narrower in scope than copyright.
298. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (explaining the historical and modern
categorization of trademark law).
299. See supra notes 295–297 and accompanying text.
300. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2012) (establishing that registration constitutes evidence of an
“exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce” in connection with goods or services specified
in registration); id. § 1060 (providing for the assignment of a trademark to another). With regard to
transferability, the trademark law requires that the assignee of the trademark use it only on products
similar in kind and quality to those of the assignor. See, e.g., Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929–30
(2d Cir. 1984) (explaining that using assigned trademark on dissimilar products constitutes invalid
transfer of trademark without associated goodwill).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/1

50

Hickey: Copyright/Commerce Clause Collision: A Subject Matter Approach

2013]

THE COPYRIGHT/COMMERCE CLAUSE COLLISION

51

trademark law is the use of a registered mark in commerce, in a way
likely to confuse consumers.301 Simple copying alone cannot trigger
liability.
Trademarks are thus not a generalized right against
unauthorized reproduction; they are instead a species of commercial
regulation effectuated through limited exclusive rights. As such, they
are not “copyright laws,” and need not comport with the Copyright
Clause’s limitations.
B. Database Protection
Whether a sui generis system of protection for factual compilations
and databases is a “copyright law” will depend on the form of database
protection enacted. Congress has not chosen to enact such protection,
though several proposals were put forward in the wake of Feist.302
Regardless of the form of protection enacted (if any), the material
protected will almost certainly be “expression” for our purposes, as the
information in databases can usually be considered fruits of intellectual
labor.303 (Though many databases will not satisfy the standard of
originality as articulated in Feist,304 affirmative limitations of the
Copyright Clause cannot be relied upon to distinguish a copyright law,
lest the whole inquiry become circular.305) Aside from this factor,
however, it is difficult to generalize about database protection in the
abstract. Two given forms of database protection may be radically
different in terms of either the actions proscribed or the nature of the
rights granted—and thus one may be a “copyright law” while another is
not.
A comparison between two congressional proposals for database
protection,306 analyzed in greater detail by Professor Yochai Benkler,307
is instructive on this point. The broader bill, the “Collections of
Information Antipiracy Act,” (the CIAA) has the characteristics of a
“copyright law” and so is unconstitutional as it protects non-original
works in contravention of Feist.
The CIAA broadly prohibits
301. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2012) (providing cause of action when a registered mark, without
consent of the registrant, is used in commerce in a way “likely to cause confusion” among consumers).
302. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text (citing to congressional proposals for database
protection and academic commentary regarding these proposals).
303. See supra Part V.B.3 (defining “expression” for purposes of the “copyright law” inquiry).
304. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (requiring
independent creation and a minimal degree of creativity as a prerequisite to copyright).
305. See supra Part V.B.1.a (explaining the circularity issue).
306. H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999). Both bills were referred to
and reported out of committee. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-350, pt. 1 (1999) (describing H.R. 354, the
“Collections of Information Antipiracy Act”); H.R. REP. NO. 106-349, pt. 1 (1999) (describing H.R.
1858, the “Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999”).
307. See Benkler, supra note 65, at 578–86 (comparing House Bill 354 and House Bill 1858).
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“extraction” of the information in a database either to (1) make the
information available to others, or (2) in a manner that causes market
harm to the producer of the original database.308 This means the CIAA
may reach activities as basic as loaning a CD-ROM database to a friend
so she may make a personal copy.309 Functionally—if “market harm” is
given a reasonably broad construction—the CIAA’s prohibitions on
extraction operate as a general prohibition on reproduction.310 As to the
nature of the rights granted, the CIAA establishes a private right of
action in the creator of the source database311—that is, an exclusive,
transferable312 property right. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
the CIAA is a “copyright law” that must comport with the Copyright
Clause’s requirements.
In contrast, the “Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of
1999” (the CIAIA) is not a copyright law, and instead a permissible
commercial regulation under the Commerce Clause. First, the CIAIA’s
prohibitions are much more limited than those of the CIAA. The CIAIA
does not proscribe the act of duplicating a database, but only selling or
distributing copied databases in commerce, and in competition with the
original database.313 Unlike the CIAA, the CIAIA does not reach
personal reproductions, targeting only business competitors “freeriding” on the work of the original database creator.314 It is, like
trademark law, a narrow grant of rights, prohibiting only particular uses
of copied expression in commerce. Secondly, the CIAIA does not
create a private right of action and would instead grant enforcement
power to the Federal Trade Commission.315 As the CIAIA does not
create private property rights, nor broadly proscribe unauthorized
reproduction, it is not a copyright law. It serves as a good example of
how database protection might be accomplished under Commerce
Clause authority without violating the limits of the Copyright Clause.
C. The DMCA’s Anti-Circumvention Provisions
The DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions ultimately survive
Copyright Clause scrutiny. First, the provisions enforcing access
308.
309.
310.
rule.”).
311.
312.
creator).
313.
314.
315.

H.R. 354 § 1402.
See Benkler, supra note 65, at 579 (using this as an example of the CIAA’s scope).
See id. at 583 (“In effect, House Bill 354 functions economically like an intellectual property
H.R. 354 § 1406.
See H.R. 354 § 1402 (giving protection to “successors in interest” of the original database
H.R. 1858 § 102.
See Benkler, supra note 65, at 579.
H.R. 1858 § 107.
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restrictions316 are not copyright laws. The action proscribed is not
reproduction, but only the circumvention of a technological protection
measure to gain access to a work protected by said measures. Though
this aspect of the DMCA tends to strengthen copyright rights by
deterring piracy, a law banning contravention of access restrictions is no
more a copyright law than a law prohibiting the breaking of a safe in
which copyrighted works are stored.317
The provisions enforcing use restrictions,318 however, are of a
different character. These might be construed as copyright laws, since
they may effectively prohibit an owner or user of a copyrighted work
from reproducing the work (or creating a derivative work, or any of the
other “rights of the copyright owner” protected by the technological
measure).319 The material protected is identical, as the DMCA applies
only to works protected under the copyright statutes.320 Finally, the
rights granted are substantially similar, as the DMCA provides for
individual civil (as well as criminal) actions to enforce its anticircumvention provisions. In sum, the use restrictions create exclusive
rights to prohibit conduct (via technological measures) that is often
already proscribed by traditional copyright laws. There is one feature,
however, that may serve to distinguish the use restriction provisions
from typical copyright laws: It is only trafficking in devices—not the act
of circumvention itself—that is prohibited.321 Since the personal actions
of the user are not controlled by this provision, the right granted is more
specialized than the general copyright grant—it may be that, like
trademark law, the narrower scope of the right sufficiently distinguishes
the use restriction provisions from typical “copyright laws.”322
Ultimately, however, it is unclear whether the DMCA’s use
restrictions even violate any of the Copyright Clause’s limitations. Most
of the concerns about creating de facto perpetual rights focus on the
access restrictions—which, as we have seen, are unequivocally not
“copyright laws”—and not the use restrictions.323 Further, as the Elcom
316. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012).
317. See David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 673, 686 (2000) (“The basic provision [of the DMCA] is equivalent to breaking into a castle—
the invasion inside another’s property is itself the offense. . . . [T]he gravamen here is not copyright
infringement.”).
318. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2012).
319. See id. § 1201(b)(1)(A)–(C) (extending protection only when the “technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title”).
320. Id.
321. See id. § 1201(b)(1) (“No person shall manufacture . . . or otherwise traffic in any
technology, product, service, device . . . .”).
322. See supra Part VI.A (arguing that trademarks are not copyright laws due to narrow character
of the rights granted).
323. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text (explaining theories under which the DMCA
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court recognized, the series of assumptions required to reach the
conclusion that the anti-circumvention provisions create perpetual rights
rests on “tenuous” empirical grounds.324 Such hypothetical scenarios
are a weak basis upon which to strike down a statute as facially
unconstitutional. The Copyright Clause does not protect against all
potential adverse consequences to copyright values; rather, it prohibits
the enactment of copyright laws in violation of its express limitations.
D. The Anti-Bootlegging Statutes
As alluded to previously,325 the criminal anti-bootlegging statute326 is
not a “copyright law” because it cannot be considered a property right.
The “rights” granted by Section 2319A are not held by any individual.
Though a performer may complain about bootlegging, enforcement is
had only at the discretion of the government; the performer does not
“own” anything. As a criminal law, the presumed motivation is one of
moral disapproval: the law serves as a societal expression that particular
conduct is wrong and should be punished. Though it may incidentally
trigger the sort of monopoly costs that motivated the Framers of the
Copyright Clause,327 allocation of wealth is not the primary motivation,
and the discretionary enforcement mechanism may reduce the incidence
of such costs.
The civil anti-bootlegging statute,328 in contrast, possesses all the
characteristics of a copyright law. Its proscriptions are targeted against
unauthorized reproduction of live musical performances.329 Though
transmission and distribution of bootlegged copies is also prohibited,330
the production of a first unauthorized copy will typically be a necessary
prerequisite to liability. As to the material protected, it can scarcely be
doubted that musical performances constitute expression.331 Finally, the
rights granted are identical to those of usual copyright laws: Section
may allow for the creation of de facto perpetual rights and tie up the public domain).
324. See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“[T]he
argument that Congress’ ban on the sale of circumvention tools has the effect of allowing publishers to
claim copyright-like protection in public domain works is tenuous and unpersuasive.”).
325. See supra Part V.B.4 (explaining that criminally-enforced laws cannot be considered
possessory in nature).
326. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2012).
327. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 15, at 1160–62 (explaining that the Framers of the
Constitution deeply distrusted governmental grants of exclusive rights which imposed monopoly costs
on the public).
328. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
329. Id. § 1101(a)(1).
330. Id. § 1101(a)(2)–(3).
331. “Musical works” are listed second, after only literary works, among the categories of
protected works in the current copyright statute. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2).
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1101 makes violators liable “to the same extent as an infringer of
copyright.”332 Section 1101 thus allocates exclusive, property rights in
an individual (the performer), consisting primarily of a generalized right
against unauthorized reproduction.333 Section 1101 is therefore a
“copyright law,” and invalid if it does not comport with the limitations
of the Copyright Clause.
The preceding analysis does not necessarily mean that the whole of
Section 1101 must be ruled unconstitutional or that the federal
government is powerless to regulate bootlegging. Under the theory this
Article has advanced, all the Copyright Clause requires is that
“copyright laws” satisfy its explicit restrictions. As an initial matter,
this means that Section 1101 must contain some sort of statute of
limitations—whether added through amendment or judicially
implied334—to comport with the “limited Times” requirement. The
fixation problem is more intractable, though it has not yet been
definitively established that fixation is a constitutional requirement.335
Even if it is so held, the third act prohibited under Section 1101—which
bans only trafficking in bootlegged records336—might be saved by
severing it from the rest of Section 1101. A law banning only sale and
distribution of an article in commerce is a much narrower right than the
typical, generalized, copyright grant—like trademark, such a prohibition
may be construed as a specialized commercial regulation, and thus not a
copyright law.337 Finally, the federal government is free to enforce a
policy against bootlegging through other means (like Section 2319A),
and there is no barrier to regulation of unfixed performances by the
states.
VII. CONCLUSION
As this Article has endeavored to show, whether Congress may avoid
the limitations of the Copyright Clause through reliance on Commerce
332. Id. § 1101(a).
333. There is one potentially relevant distinction between rights under Section 1101 and familiar
copyright rights. Section 1101 grants rights contingent on the consent of the “performer or performers
involved”—not the owner of copyright in the performance—so it is not immediately apparent whether
these rights are transferable to persons other than the performer. This difference, however, is not
enough to make Section 1101 not a copyright law.
334. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (exploring possibilities to imply statute of
limitations for anti-bootlegging statutes).
335. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining the debate over whether fixation is a
constitutional requirement).
336. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2012) (making liable anyone who “distributes or offers to distribute,
sells or offers to sell, rents or offers to rent, or traffics in any [bootlegged] copy or phonorecord”).
337. See supra Part VI.A (arguing that trademarks are not copyright laws due to narrow character
of the rights granted).
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Clause power is a question in need of a consistent, coherent theory,
applicable to areas as diverse as trademark protection and the DMCA.
This Article has offered such a unified theory in its subject matter
approach. The basic idea is simple: Acts of Congress that are so similar
to traditional forms of intellectual property protection so as to be
“copyright laws” must comport with the requirements of the Copyright
Clause—notwithstanding the availability of an alternative enumerated
power. To give substantive content to the “copyright law” inquiry, this
Article has articulated and defined several important factors—the
activities proscribed, the material protected, and the nature of the rights
granted. The “copyright law” test provides a clear, workable resolution
to the Copyright/Commerce Clause collision that reconciles seemingly
inconsistent precedents. Recognizing Congress’s broad power to
legislate in areas significant to national commerce, the “copyright law”
test is flexible, allowing Congress to regulate most areas if it so chooses,
so long as the means of regulation are carefully crafted. Perhaps most
important, the “copyright law” theory functions to maintain, within their
traditional sphere of applicability, an effective role for the limitations of
the Copyright Clause.
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